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Abstract
Model checking is an automated technique for the verification of finite-state systems that
is widely used in practice. In model checking, a modelM is verified against a specifica-
tion ϕ, exhaustively checking that the tree of all computations ofM satisfiesϕ. When
ϕ fails to hold inM , the negative result is accompanied by acounterexample: a compu-
tation inM that demonstrates the failure. State of the art model checkers apply Binary
Decision Diagrams (BDDs) as well as satisfiability solvers for this task. However, both
methods suffer from the state explosion problem, which restricts the application of model
checking to only modestly sized systems. The importance of model checking makes it
worthwhile to explore alternative technologies, in the hope of broadening the applicabil-
ity of the technique to a wider class of systems.
Description Logic (DL) is a family of knowledge representation formalisms based on
decidable fragments of first order logic. DL is used mainly for designing ontologies in
information systems. In recent years several DL reasoners have been developed, demon-
strating an impressive capability to cope with very large ontologies.
This work consists of two parts. In the first we harness the growing ability of DL
reasoners to solve model checking problems. We show how DL can serve as a natural
setting for representing and solving a model checking problem, and present a variety
of encodings that translate such problems into consistency queries in DL. Experimental
results, using the Description Logic reasonerFaCT++, demonstrate that for some systems
and properties, our method can outperform existing ones.
In the second part we approach a different aspect of model checking. When a speci-
fication fails to hold in a model and a counterexample is presented to the user, the coun-
terexample may itself be complex and difficult to understand. We propose an automatic
technique to find the computation steps and their associated variable values, that are of
particular importance in generating the counterexample. We use the notion ofcausalityto
formally define a set of causes for the failure of the specification on the given counterex-
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ample. We give a linear-time algorithm to detect the causes, and we demonstrate how
these causes can be presented to the user as a visual explanation of the failure.
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Hardware and software systems have become an integral component of our everyday lives,
and we use them for larger and larger parts of our routine activities. While today’s world
cannot be imagined without these systems, software and hardware programs are full of
errors, that often make them unreliable. Errors can be very expensive (e.g., the floating-
point division bug of Intel’s Pentium processor [Hal95], cost $500,000,000 of damage)
and worse – life threatening (e.g., the Therac-25 accidents [LT93] cost the lives of four
people). The main reason for the unreliability of today’s hardware and software systems
is their growing complexity that makes them extremely difficult to verify. In fact, in the
hardware industry, verification is recognized as the most resource-consuming component
of the design process, taking over 60% of the development time and effort. Finding new
verification methods and developing better verification tools can therefore have a signifi-
cant impact on today’s industry.
Verification of software and hardware systems is traditionally done usingtesting: the
system is given sequences of legal input behaviors and the outputs are analyzed compared
to some expected results. For large systems, both the generation of test cases and the
analysis of the results are often automated. However, for any large enough system, run-
ning test cases cannot guarantee coverage of all possible behaviors: there are simply too
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many cases (possibly an infinite number of them) to be covered. Thus, when testing is the
only method used for verification, systems are delivered to the market with many possi-
ble cases untested. For many systems however, especially safety-critical ones, this is not
enough, and a higher degree of coverage is required. In order to meet this requirement,
formal verificationmethods have been developed, where mathematical techniques are ap-
plied to perform the verification. When properly applied, formal verification methods can
guarantee correctness of a system with respect to its specification.
Formal verification is generally divided into two main approaches, thedeductiveap-
proach and thealgorithmicone. The first is known asTheorem Proving[GM93, BKM95,
KM97], and involves the development of a mathematicalproof for the correctness of a
given system with respect to its specification. Since developing a proof is a hard task,
and in most cases cannot be done automatically, theorem provers are interactive tools that
allow the user to specify the main steps of a proof, avoiding, as much as possible, the
tedious parts of it.
This work concentrates on the algorithmic approach to formal verification, known
asmodel checking([CE81, QS82], c.f.[CGP00]). Model checking is a fully automated
technique for verifying finite-state systems, that is very effective in the verification of
hardware and software programs. In model checking, a modelM , given as a set of state
variablesV and their next-state relations, is verified against a specificationϕ. If the spec-
ification holds on the tree of all computations ofM we denote itM |= ϕ. Whenϕ fails
to hold inM , the model checker provides acounterexample[CGMZ95]: a computation
of M that demonstrates the failure.
Specifications to be checked are given intemporal logic– a dialect of modal logic with
modalities referring to time. The main temporal logics used in practice areLinear Tem-
poral Logic (LTL) [Pnu77] andComputation Tree Logic(CTL) [CE81]. Temporal logic
specifications, whether given inLTL or in CTL, are divided into two main types [Lam77]:
safetyformulas, stating that “something bad never happens”, andlivenessformulas, as-
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serting that “something good eventually happens”. The violation of a safety formula can
be shown by a finite prefix of a computation path, leading to an erroneous state, while the
violation of a liveness formula can only be shown by an infinite path, or a loop, in the case
of a finite system. Liveness formulas are therefore considered more difficult to verify. In
many cases, a liveness formula is accompanied by afairness constraintrequiring that the
violating loop satisfies some fairness condition.
The main challenge in model checking is called thestate space explosionproblem,
where the number of states in the model grows exponentially in the number of variables
describing it. Different approaches exist to deal with this problem. They can be roughly
divided intoexplicit state methods, that are mostly applied to software systems, andim-
plicit state (orsymbolic) methods that are better applied to hardware models. In this work
we concentrate on symbolic methods for hardware model checking.
In symbolic model checking the system under verification is represented as sets of
states and transitions, and Boolean functions are used to manipulate those sets. Two main
symbolic methods are used to perform model checking. The first, known asSymbolic
Model Verifier(SMV) [McM93] is based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [Bry86]
for representing the state space as well as for performing the model checking procedure.
The second is known asBounded Model Checking(BMC) [BCCZ99]. Using this method,
the model description is unfoldedk times (for a given boundk). The unfolded model as
well as thenegationof the specification are then translated into a propositional formula,
and a satisfiability solver is applied to the formula to find a satisfying assignment. Such
an assignment, if found, demonstrates an error in the model.
The introduction of the BDD-based model checking method and later on the satisfia-
bility based ones, have significantly improved the performance and applicability of model
checking, and have brought the field from a completely theoretical one in the early eighties
into a wide-spread practical technique, used in industry [BDEGW03, Ger01, AAH+03].
However, the state explosion problem remains the main problem of this field, restricting
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the application of model checking to only modestly sized systems. The importance of
verification in general and model checking in particular, makes it worthwhile to explore
alternative technologies, in the hope of enabling the application of the technique to a
wider class of systems.
In the first part of this thesis we explore the possibility of usingDescription Logic
reasoningto solve model checking problems. Description Logic (DL) ([BCM+03]) is a
family of knowledge representation formalisms, mainly used for specifying ontologies for
information systems. The basic elements in description logic areatomic concepts(sets
of individuals) andatomic roles(binary relations between individuals). There are many
dialectsof description logic that differ from each other by the constructs they allow for
building new concepts from existing ones. The most commonly used dialect is called
Attributive Language with Complement, orALC. Given two conceptsC1 andC2, and a
role R, the DL dialectALC allows the construction of the concepts¬C1 (all individuals
that do not belong to the set represented byC1), C1 u C2 (the individuals that belong to
bothC1 andC2), and∀R.C1 (the individualsa, such that for allb whereR(a, b) holds,b
belongs toC1). In general, the more expressive a DL dialect is, the more complex it is to
reason about.
Description Logic is used for describing ontologies and reasoning about them. An on-
tologyT is called aterminology, and consists of a set ofconcept inclusion dependencies.
Each inclusion dependency has the formC1 v C2, and asserts containment properties of
relevant concepts in an underlying domain, e.g., thatcowsare included inanimals
COWv ANIMAL ,
and also inthose things that do not eat animals
COW v ∀eats.¬ANIMAL.
In this latter case,eatsis an example of arole. The main reasoning service provided by
a DL system is theconcept consistencyservice, that is, for a given terminologyT and
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conceptC, to determine if there is a non-empty interpretation ofC, that also satisfies each
inclusion dependency inT . We denote concept consistency asT |=dl C (note that we use
“ |=dl ” for consistency in DL to differentiate it from “|=” that is used in the model check-
ing world). In recent years several DL reasoners have been introduced, such asFaCT++
[TH06], Pellet [SPG+07] andRacer [HM01], demonstrating growing capability to rea-
son about large ontologies.
We show how Description Logic technology can be used for symbolic model check-
ing. We present a variety of encodings of model checking problems as Description Logic
terminologies over different dialects. In all cases we provide a linear encoding of am del
description(or program) and a specification as a DL terminology, and pose a query in
such a way that interpretations correspond to errors in the system. We present several
methods to support bounded model checking of safety properties, that result in a natural
symbolic representation of the sets of states and transitions. Experimental results compar-
ing the different methods are surprising: although the methods are closely related, they
perform significantly different.
We then present an encoding for model checking of liveness formulas in DL. Our main
contribution for this type of formulas is the introduction of an algorithm to support fair-
ness constraints in DL. This algorithm enhances the tableaux algorithm for DL reasoning,
and it is thus of interest to the DL community. On the other hand, it introduces a novel
approach to fair path detection, and thus has the potential of improving model checking
performance for some cases.
The second part of this work tackles a different aspect of model checking: the analy-
sis of a counterexample. When a formula fails to hold in a model, the first step in de-
bugging the problem is to examine the counterexample in order to understand the error it
demonstrates. In many cases, however, the task of understanding the counterexample is
non-trivial, and may require a significant manual effort.
An explanation of a counterexample deals with the question:what values on the com-
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putation trace cause it to falsify the specification?To deal with this problem, we adapt the
formal definition of causality of Halpern and Pearl [HP01]. We view a counterexample
trace as a matrixM × N of values, whereM is the number of time units (thel ngth)
of the counterexample, andN the number of variables appearing in the counterexample.
An entry (i, j) in the matrix corresponds to the value of variablej at time i. We look
for those entries in the matrix that are causes for the first failure ofϕ on π, according to
the definition of [HP01]. We show that the complexity of detecting an exact causal set is
NP-complete, based on the complexity result for causality in binary models [EL01]. We
then present an over-approximation algorithm whose complexity is linear in the size of
the formula and in the length of the counterexample. Our contribution is both theoretical,
in defining the set of causes, and practical, in introducing the explanation algorithm that
is used in practice.
1.1 Related Work
Model checking using DL
The connection between knowledge-based reasoning and model checking has been ex-
plored before. Gottlob et al in [GGV00, GGV02] analyzed the expressive power ofDat-
alogstatements, and compared them to known temporal logics. Sahasrabudhe in [Sah04]
performed model checking of telephony feature interactions by using SQL on an explicit
state representation of the model, and compared the results with model checking a similar
explicit state representation using the model checker SMV [McM93]. Both Sahasrabudhe
and Gottlob et al, however, used an explicit representation of the model, as opposed to
the representation of the modeldescriptionthat we propose. This difference is crucial,
since in many cases the Kripke structure for the model is too big to be built, and symbolic
methods must be used.
Our paper [BDTW06] was the first to suggest the use of Description Logic reasoners
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for model checking. However, the method described in that paper required a synchro-
nization between the progress of different state variables, that resulted in a blow-up in the
number of explored states.
Since the DL dialects we use are fragments of first order logic, our method can be
viewed as performing model checking using deductive methods. The work of Tuomi-
nen [Tuo88, Tuo89] is close to ours in this sense. Tuominen used theorem proving for
the verification of Petri-net systems. He useddeterministic propositional dynamic logic
(DPDL) to represent his systems, a logic that is more expressive (and thus more complex
to verify) than the DL dialects that we use.
Finally, Dovier and Quintarelli in [DQ01] were interested in the opposite direction:
they translated a knowledge-base into a Kripke structure, and a query into a temporal
logic formula. They then used a model checker to make inferences about the knowledge-
base.
Counterexample explanation
The problem ofunderstandinga counterexample has attracted a significant amount of
attention in recent years (see for example [CIW+01, JRS02, DRS03, BNR03, Gro04,
GK04, CG05, SQL05, WYIG06, GSB07, SB07, SFBD08] ). These works, however,
concentrated on a different aspect ofunderstandingof a counterexample. Mainly, they
addressed the question of finding the root cause of the failure in themodeland proposed
automatic ways to extract more information about the model, to ease the debugging pro-
cedure. Naturally, the algorithms proposed in the above mentioned works involve imple-
mentation in a specific tool. For example, the BDD procedure of [JRS02] would not work
for a SAT based model checker like those of [Gro04, BNR03]. In contrast, the method we
propose is independent of the tool that generated the counterexample, and can be applied
as an external layer to any model checking tool.
There are several works that tie the definition of causality by Halpern and Pearl to
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formal verification. Most closely related to our work is the paper by Chockler et. al
[CHK08], in which causality and its quantitative measure, responsibility, are viewed as a
refinement of coverage in model checking. In another work, causality and responsibility
are used to improve the refinement techniques of symbolic trajectory evaluation (STE)
[CGY08].
1.2 Overview of Thesis
In Chapter 2 we give the needed background for the thesis. In Section 2.1 we discuss
topics in model checking: we describe the temporal logics used in the thesis, give the
basic definition of amodeland define an example model and specification that are used
in the rest of the document. We briefly discuss the two main symbolic model check-
ing methods: McMillan’s symbolic model checking using BDDs [McM93], and bounded
model checking [BCCZ99] based on Satisfiability solving. Section 2.2 presents basic
facts about Description Logic [BCM+03]. We describe the syntax and semantics of com-
mon dialects, explain how ontologies are defined in description logic, and use an example
to demonstrate a reasoning service provided by a DL reasoner.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we present our results on model checking using Description Logic.
In Chapter 3 we present the symbolic encoding of a model description, and define the dif-
ferent methods for bounded model checking of safety formulas. We prove the correctness
of our encodings and discuss experimental results. The work described in this chapter
appears in [BDTW07a, BDTW07b, BDTW08, BDTTW08]. In Chapter 4 we show, for
the same encoding, how liveness formulas can be described. Since fairness cannot be ex-
pressed in the dialects used in this document, we propose a method to implement fairness
checking in DL. This work appears in [BDPT+09]. Chapter 5 is devoted to explanation
of a counterexample. We define causality in counterexamples, analyze its complexity







This chapter gives the needed background of model checking and description logic. We
start with model checking in the section below, and discusses Description Logic in Sec-
tion 2.2 .
2.1 Model Checking
Model checking ([CE81, QS82], c.f.[CGP00]) is a technique for the formal verification
of hardware and software systems. In model checking, a modelM is verified against
a specificationϕ. If the specification holds in the model we denote itM |= ϕ. For
our discussion, the system under verification, or themodel, is assumed to have a finite
number of Boolean state variables, that may simultaneously change their values as time
progresses. The mathematical representation of such a model is called a Kripke structure,
and its formal definition is given in Section 2.1.1 below. Synchronous hardware systems
are naturally translated into Kripke structures, as these are indeed composed of variables
that work in parallel, changing their value at a clock’s tick. For asynchronous hardware
designs, as well as for software programs, some sort of abstraction may be needed in order
to adapt them to the model of a Kripke structure.
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In order to verify a given model we need to specify its desired behavior. In model
checking, specifications are given as temporal logic formulas [Pnu77] – a language that
allows specifying the behavior of the program variables over time. In Section 2.1.2 we
present the two main temporal logics that are used in practice, namely, LTL and CTL, and
discuss different categories of formulas. In Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 we discuss the two
main existing methods for symbolic model checking.
2.1.1 Kripke Structures
A Kripke structure is a labeled directed graph, defined in the context of Modal Logic. We
describe here a restricted type of Kripke structure that is used to model reactive systems.
We associate a Kripke structure with a finite setV of Boolean variables. Each node in the
graph is labeled with a subset ofV (the variables that are assigned 1 in the node). Thus
each node in the graph represents astateof the modeled system. Different nodes in the
graph must be labeled with different sets, that is, each state of the system can appear at
most once in the Kripke structure. Thus, ifV includesn variables, the Kripke structure
may have at most2n nodes. An edge from one node to another means that a transition
is possible in the system, from a given state to the next, in one time unit. From each
node there must exist at least one outgoing edge (that is, there are no “dead-ends” in the
system). The mathematical definition of a Kripke structure is given below.
Definition 1 (Kripke Structure). Let V be a set of Boolean variables. AKripke structure
M overV is a four tupleM = (S, I, R, L) where
1. S is a finite set of states.
2. I ⊆ S is the set of initial states.
3. R ⊆ S × S is the transition relation that must be total, that is, for every states ∈ S
there is a states′ ∈ S such thatR(s, s′).
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4. L : S → 2V is a function that labels each state with the set of variables true in that
state.
We view each states as a truth assignment to the variablesV . We view a set of states
as a Boolean function overV , characterizing the set. For example, the set of initial states
I is considered as a Boolean function overV . Thus, if a states belongs toI, we write
s |= I. Similarly, if vi ∈ L(s) we writes |= vi, and ifvi 6∈ L(s) we writes |= ¬vi. We
say thatw = s0, s1, ... is apath in M if s0 |= I and∀i, 0 ≤ i, (si, si+1) ∈ R.
Example 2. Figure 2.1 draws the states and transitions of a Kripke structure, called
Simple . The initial state is colored dark, and the label of each state is the value of
the vector(v1, v2, v3).
Figure 2.1: The Kripke structure “Simple model”
Kripke structures are used for modeling the behaviors of real hardware and software
systems. However, in practice the full Kripke structure of a system is usually too big and
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too complex to be explicitly described. Rather, a model is given as a set of Boolean vari-
ablesV = {v1, ..., vn}, their initial values and their next-state assignments. Moreover,
for every reasonably-sized system, the Kripke structure is too big to be explicitly built.
Rather, systems are described by giving the behavior of every state variable separately.
We concentrate on hardware, where systems are naturally described in this way by exist-
ing Hardware Description Languages (HDL). In standard HDLs however, the system is
deterministic, and multiple behaviors can only be due to the behavior of the inputs. The
input language ofSMV[McM93] allows a more complex non-deterministic behavior. Our
notation is an abstraction of the input language ofSMV.
Definition 3 (Model Description). Let V = {v1, ..., vn} be a set of Boolean variables. A
tupleMD = (IMD , [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) is aModel DescriptionoverV whereIMD, ci, c′i
are Boolean expressions overV .
The semantics of a model description is a Kripke structureMMD = (S, IM , R, L),
whereS = 2V , L(s) = s, IM = {s|s |= IMD}, andR = {(s, s′) : ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, s |= ci
impliess′ |= ¬vi ands |= c′i ∧ ¬ci impliess′ |= vi}.
Intuitively, a pair〈ci, c′i〉 defines the next-state assignment of variablevi in terms of




1 if c′i ∧ ¬ci
{0, 1} otherwise
where the assignment{0, 1} indicates that for every possible next-state value of variables
v1, ...vi−1, vi+1, ..., vn there must exist a next-state withvi = 1, and a next-state with
vi = 0.






0 if v1 ∧ v2










The full model description is given by
Simple = (I, [〈v1 ∧ v2, v3〉, 〈¬v2, v1 ∧ ¬v1〉, 〈¬v1, v1〉])
overV = {v1, v2, v3} with I = ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ¬v3.
This example shall be used throughout this document to demonstrate our methods.
2.1.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal Logic is a dialect of Modal Logic. The use of Temporal Logic for the speci-
fication of reactive systems was first suggested by Pnueli in [Pnu77] and has since been
accepted as the major language for the specification of such systems. Several types of tem-
poral logics exist in the literature, with the most commonly used ones beingLTL [Pnu77]
andCTL [CE81]. We describe the logicsLTL andCTL below, and then discuss different
types of temporal logic formulas, known assafetyandlivenessformulas.
Linear Temporal Logic
Given a finite set AP of atomic propositions, formulas ofLTL are recursively defined as
follows:
• Every atomic proposition is anLTL formula.
• If ϕ andψ areLTL formulas then so are:
• ¬ϕ • ϕ ∧ ψ • Xϕ • [ϕUψ]
Additional operators are defined as syntactic sugaring of those above:
• true = ¬p ∨ p • ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) • Fϕ = [true Uϕ]
• ϕ→ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ • Gϕ = ¬F¬ϕ • [ϕWψ] = [ϕUψ] ∨Gϕ
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The formal semantics ofLTL formulas is defined with respect to an infinite computa-
tion path. A computation path is a sequence of statesw = s0, s1, s2, ... wheresi is a truth
assignments to the atomic propositionsAP . We sometimes usew to denote a finite prefix
of a path. The suffix of a computation,sj, sj+1, sj+2, ... is denoted bywj. Given a prefix
ρ and a pathw, we denoteρ · w the concatenation of them. We usew |= ϕ to indicate
that theLTL formulaϕ holds on the computationw. The semantics of|= is inductively
defined as follows.
• w |= p IFF s0 |= p
• w |= ¬ϕ IFFw 6|= ϕ
• w |= ϕ ∧ ψ IFFw |= ϕ andw |= ψ
• w |= Xϕ IFFw1 |= ϕ
• w |= [ϕUψ] IFF ∃k ≥ 0 such thatwk |= ψ and for all0 ≤ j < k, wj |= ϕ
It is common practice to view computations satisfying anLTL formula as infinite
wordsover the alphabet2AP , where the letters of the alphabet are the states of the compu-
tation paths [WVS83, VW86, SVW87]. Under this interpretation, one can talk about the
languageaccepted by anLTL formula, referring to the set of words satisfying the formula.
Languages that can be accepted byLTL formulas are omega-regular languages. Such lan-
guages are accepted by Büchi automata. We give the definition of a Büchi automaton
below.
Definition 5 (Büchi automaton). A Büchi automaton is a 4-tuple(S, I, δ, F ) where
• S is a finite set of states
• I ⊆ S is a set of initial states
• δ ⊆ S × S is a transition relation
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• F ⊆ S is a set of accepting states
An infinite sequence of states is accepted by a Büchi automaton if and only if it contains
infinitely many accepting states.
In most cases, the verification of anLTL formulaϕ is done by first building a B̈uchi
automatonA that accepts¬ϕ [Var96], and then verifying thatA accepts no computation
of the modelM .
Negation Normal Form
For bothLTL andCTL (see below) it is possible to transfer formulas into equivalent ones
in Negation Normal Form (NNF), where negations are allowed on atomic propositions
only. For example, theLTL formula¬G(p→ Xq), where a temporal operator is negated,
is equivalent toF(p ∧X¬q), that is inNNF. The transformation is straightforward using
the temporal operations defined above.
Computation Tree Logic
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is a branching time logic. This means that time is viewed
as a tree, where one state may have more than one successive state. To capture this,
branching time logics introduce, on top of the temporal operators used forLTL, two Path
Quantifiers: theA path quantifier stands for “All paths”, and theE path quantifier stands
for “there exists a path”. InCTL, a path quantifier must immediately precede a temporal
operator. A formula inNNF form, consisting of theA path quantifier only, is called an
ACTL formula If only theE path quantifier exists it is called anECTL formula. The
formal definition ofCTL is then given as follows:
Definition 6 (Computation Tree Logic). Given a finite set AP of atomic propositions,
formulas ofCTL are recursively defined as follows:
• Every atomic proposition is aCTL formula.
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• If ϕ andψ areCTL formulas then so are:
• ¬ϕ • ϕ ∧ ψ • AXϕ • EXϕ • A[ϕUψ] • E[ϕUψ]
Additional operators are defined as syntactic sugaring of those above:
• ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) • ϕ→ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ
• AFϕ = A[true Uϕ] • EFϕ = E[true Uϕ]
• AGϕ = ¬E[true U¬ϕ] • EGϕ = ¬A[true U¬ϕ]
• A[ϕ V ψ] = ¬E[¬ϕ U¬ψ] • E[ϕ V ψ] = ¬A[¬ϕ U¬ψ]
• A[ϕ Wψ] = ¬E[¬ψ U¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ] • E[ϕ Wψ] = ¬A[¬ψ U¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]
The intuitive semantics ofCTL operators are given in Figure 2.2. The formal seman-
Figure 2.2:CTL Operators
tics of CTL formulas is defined with respect to a Kripke structureM = (S, I, R, L) over
a set of variablesV = {v1, ..., vk}. The notationM, s |= ϕ, means that the formulaϕ is
true in states of the modelM .
• M, s |= p iff s |= p
• M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ
• M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ andM, s |= ψ
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• M, s0 |= AXp iff for all paths(s0, s1, ...),M, s1 |= p
• M, s0 |= EXp iff for some path(s0, s1, ...),M, s1 |= p
• M, s0 |= A[ϕUψ] iff for all paths (s0, s1, ...), for somei, M, si |= ψ and for all
j ≤ i,M, sj |= ϕ
• M, s0 |= E[ϕUψ] iff for some path(s0, s1, ...), for somei, M, si |= ψ and for all
j ≤ i,M, sj |= ϕ
We say that a Kripke structureM = (S, I, R, L) satisfies aCTL formulaϕ (M |= ϕ)
if for all si ∈ I,M, si |= ϕ.
Polarity of Subformulas
Let ϕ be a temporal logic formula and letψ be an occurrence of a subformula inϕ.
We say thatψ has apositive polarityin ϕ, if ψ is under the scope of an even number
of negations. Otherwise, we say thatψ has anegative polarityin ϕ. For example, for
ϕ = ¬G(p ∧ ¬Xq), the subformulaψ = Xq has a positive polarity, andψ′ = p has a
negative polarity. Note that ifϕ is given in NNF, only propositions can have a negative
polarity inϕ.
The Common Fragment ofLTL and ACTL
Monika Maidl in [Mai00] has investigated the relationship betweenCTL andLTL, and
characterized the fragment ofACTL that can be expressed inLTL. This fragment is called
ACTLdet, and its inductive definition is given below, where the operatorW stands for
“weak until”.
• Every atomic proposition is anACTLdet formula.
• If p is a proposition,ϕ andψ areACTLdet formulas then so are:
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• ϕ ∧ ψ • (p ∧ ϕ) ∨ (¬p ∧ ψ) • AXϕ
• A[(p ∧ ϕ)U(¬p ∧ ψ)] • A[(p ∧ ϕ)W (¬p ∧ ψ)]
It is interesting to note that most of theCTL formulas written in practical applications
belong to the common fragment ofACTL andLTL [BDFR05].
Safety and Liveness Formulas
Temporal logic specifications, whether written inLTL or in CTL, are divided into three
basic categories [Lam77, AS85, AS87, MT01]:livenessproperties,safetyproperties and
formulas that are combinations of the two. Informally, a safety formula states that “some-
thing bad never happens” while a liveness formula asserts that “somethinggood will
eventually happen”. A somewhat more formal definition was given by Alford et al. in
([AAH +85] cf. [Kin94]), defining assafetyformulas whose violation can be shown by
a finite prefix of a computation path, while the violation of a liveness formula must con-
tain an infinite path (a loop, in case of a finite model). For example, theLTL formula
G(p→ Xq) is a safety formula, since, in order to show violation, it is enough to present
a finite prefix of a computation path that leads to a state wherep holds, followed by a state
whereq does not hold. The formulaG(req → F(ack)) on the other hand is a liveness
formula, because the violation of it must show a state wherer q holds followed by an
infinite path along whichack never holds.
Fairness
When verifying a liveness formula it is many times the case that the formula should only
be verified on computation paths that arefair according to some notion. The simplest
and most commonly used fairness constraint states that some Boolean conditionp must
hold on the path infinitely often. (This constraint can be described by theLTL formula
GFp, with p being a Boolean expression over the set of variablesV ). When the fairness
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constraintfairness p is given, a legal counterexample for a liveness formula (on a
finite model) should therefore include a loop on which the liveness formula fails, but
where the expressionp holds at least on one state in the loop.
Translating Temporal Logic Formulas into Automata
As mentioned earlier, a popular method for model checking anLTL specificationϕ, is to
first build a B̈uchi automatonA¬ϕ for thenegationof ϕ with size exponential in the size
of the formula [Var96, BFH05]. For formulas in the common fragment ofLTL andACTL,
this automaton is of size linear in the size of the formula [Mai00].
OnceA¬ϕ is built, the parallel composition ofA¬ϕ with the modelM , denotedA¬ϕ||M ,
is itself a B̈uchi automaton, and its language can be checked for emptiness (if the set of
computations is not empty, it contains counterexamples forϕ). Since the accepting con-
dition of a Büchi automaton requires visiting a set of states infinitely often, the model
checking ofϕ amounts to searching for a fair path inA¬ϕ||M . For safety formulas, the
Büchi condition is not needed. Rather, the automaton built is used as a non-deterministic
finite automaton (NFA) that has accepting states (accepting error computations) [KV99].
For safety formulas as well, when a formula belongs to the common fragment ofLTL and
ACTL, the NFA built for it is linear in the size of the formula [BBDL98, Mai00, BDFR05].
Below we sketch the translation of a safety common-fragmentLTL formulaϕ into a
non-deterministic finite automaton that accepts erroneous paths. The translation is done in
two phases. In the first phase we produce, givenϕ, a regular expressionrϕ that describes
an erroneous computation. The alphabetΣϕ of rϕ contains Boolean expressions over
the propositions appearing inϕ, and words accepted byrϕ are sequences of states where
letters fromΣϕ hold. The full translation is given in [BBDL98]. We give the flavor of
the translation using a few examples. We use the lettert o indicateTrue (the Boolean
expressionp∨¬p for some propositionp). We use∗ and· in their usual regular-expression
meaning.
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1. Letϕ = G(p). We definerϕ to be(t∗) · ¬p. Note that this regular expression
accepts all computations that include a finite number of states whereTrue holds
(any state), followed by a state satisfying¬p. That is, counterexamples forG(p).
2. Letϕ = G(p→ Xq). Thenrϕ = (t∗) · p · ¬q. A computation path accepted byrϕ
demonstrates a finite sequence of states ending with a state satisfyingp, followed
by a state not satisfyingq. This is a counterexample forϕ.
3. Let ϕ = (p W q). In this case we haverϕ = (p ∧ ¬q) ∗ · (¬p ∧ ¬q). Paths
accepted byrϕ start with a finite number of states wherep holds butq does not
hold, followed by a state wherep stops holding beforeq arrives. Such a scenario is
a counterexample to(p W q).
The second phase of the translation builds a non-deterministic finite automatonA¬ϕ ac-
cepting the same language asrϕ. There are many known algorithms to achieve this
[HU79], where the constructed automaton is of size linear in the size of the regular ex-
pression. We give an example of a full translation, from a specification into an automaton,
using the automaton building algorithm of [BFR04].
Let us consider a specification stating that one cycle after the signalSTART appears,
the signalBUSY should hold untilEND arrives. IfEND never arrives,BUSY should hold
forever. We uses to representSTART, b for BUSY, ande for END. In LTL, this would be
written as follows.
ϕ = G(s → X(b W e))
Building rϕ as described above, we get
rϕ = (t∗) · s · (b ∧ ¬e) · (¬b ∧ ¬e)
The automatonA¬ϕ is given in Figure 2.1.2. The initial state is state 1, and the accepting
state is 4. Note that Figure 2.1.2 can also be seen as a state-machine, since from every
state and for every input it is possible to progress to another state. Let this state-machine
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Figure 2.3: An NFA forG(s → X(b W e))
be calledSMϕ. If ϕ holds in the model under verification, then it can never be the case
thatSMϕ reaches state 4 while (¬b∧¬e) holds in the state. Model checking ofϕ can now
be carried out by runningSMϕ with the model under verification, verifying the formula:
G¬((SMϕ = 4) ∧ (¬b ∧ ¬e)).
2.1.3 Model Checking
The main challenge in model checking is known as thestate space explosionproblem,
where the number of states in the model grows exponentially in the number of variables
describing it. In this chapter we briefly describe some of the main methods used in prac-
tice to cope with the size problem. We present symbolic model checking ofCTL ormulas
below, and then we sketch the bounded model checking method in Section 2.1.4.
Model Checking ofCTL formulas
In [EC80] Emerson and Clarke showed that various branching time properties can be
characterized as fixed points of appropriate monotonic functions. Later in [CE81] they
23
introduced the logicCTL, and showed that its operators can be characterized in this way.
To present Clarke and Emerson’s theorem, we need to introduce the notion of afunc-
tional. A functional is denotedλy.f wheref is a formula andy is a variable. The variable
y acts as a place holder. When applied to a parameterp, he functionalλy.f yieldsf with
p substituted fory. For example, ifγ = λy.(x∧ y) thenγ(true) = x∧ true = x. A fixed
point of a functionalγ is anyp such thatγ(p) = p. For example ifγ = λy.(x ∧ y) then
(x ∧ y) is a fixed point ofγ sinceγ(x ∧ y) = x ∧ x ∧ y = x ∧ y.
If γ is a monotonic functional, then it has aleast fixed pointas well as agreatest fixed
point. The least and greatest fixed points ofλy.f are denotedµy.f andνy.f respectively.
A functionalγ is union-continuous when for any non-decreasing infinite sequence of sets
p1 ⊆ p2 ⊆ ..., we have∪iγ(pi) = γ(∪ipi). Similarly, a functionalγ is intersection-
continuous when for any non-decreasing infinite sequence of setsp1 ⊆ p2 ⊆ ..., we have
∩iγ(pi) = γ(∩ipi). Tarski [Tar55] showed that ifγ is monotonic and union-continuous,
then the least fixed point ofγ is ∪iγi(false) (that is, the union of the sequence obtained
by iteratingγ with the initial value false). Similarly, ifγ is monotonic and intersection-
continuous, then the least fixed point ofγ is∩iγi(true).
Clarke and Emerson viewed aCTL formulaf as a set of states{s|s |= f}, the states
in which the formula is true. ViewingCTL formulas this way, we can observe that the
equationEFp = p∨EXEFp holds for all models. ThusEFp is a fixed point of the functional
γ = λy.p ∨ EXy, and in fact, it is theleastfixed point ofγ. In a similar way, Clarke and
Emerson obtained the following characterizations:
1. EFp = µy.(p ∨ EXy)
2. EGp = νy.(p ∧ EXy)
3. E(qUp) = µy.(p ∨ (q ∧ EXy))
Since the above functionals are monotonic, and the set of states in our models is finite,
Tarski’s theorems apply, and we get an effective procedure for calculating the fixed points.
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ForEFp for example, we get:
EFp = ∪i(λy.(p ∨ EXy))i(false)
and thus it is enough to iterateEX until a fixed point is found, starting with false. Given a
set of statesS, calculatingEX(S) is done by going one step backwards fromS, to get all
states that can reachS in one step through the transition relation.
For this, one needs an efficient way to represent and manipulate sets of states and
relations. McMillan in [McM93] showed how this can be done using Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDDs) [Bry86], that can be seen as a data structure that is especially efficient
for the representation of Boolean functions. McMillan also wrote the first symbolic model
checker called SMV [McM93].
2.1.4 Bounded Model Checking
Given a Kripke structureM , a formulaϕ, and a boundk, bounded model checking (BMC)
tries to refuteM |= ϕ by proving the existence of a witness to then gationof ϕ, of
lengthk or less. We use the notationMk to denote the modelM bounded byk. The
idea of bounded model checking was first proposed in 1999 by Biere, Cimatti, Clarke
and Zhu [BCCZ99]. They suggested to unfold a given model and specificationk imes,
using auxiliary variables, making them into a propositional formula, and then use a sat-
isfiability solver to find a satisfying assignment. Such an assignment, if found, serves
as a counterexample toϕ. The vast development of SAT solvers in recent years (See
zChaff [MMZ+01] and MiniSAT [ES04] for example), has made this method into the
leading one in the world of hardware model checking.
We describe the translation of a BMC problem into a propositional formula in the next
section.
25
Translating a BMC problem into a propositional formula
The BMC method of [BCCZ99] generates a propositional formula that is satisfiable if and
only if Mk 6|= ϕ. We describe this method for invariant formulas, e.g.ϕ = AG(p). For
such formulas, we have thatMk 6|= ϕ if and only if there exists a pathw = s0, ..., sj in
M , such thatj ≤ k andsj |= ¬p.
We use the definition of amodel description(Definition 3), given in Section 2.1.1.
Let MD = (IMD , [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) be a model description over a set of variables
V = {v1, ..., vn}, and letϕ = AG(p) be the formula to be verified, withp being a Boolean
expression overV . In order to unfoldMD until a given boundk, we introducek sets of
new propositional variablesV 1 = {v11, ..., v1n}, ..., V k = {vk1 , ..., vkn}. For readability, the
original set of variablesV , will now be calledV 0. According to Definition 3, a pair〈ci, c′i〉
states that if the conditionci holds in the current state (in terms of the variablesV 0), then
the value ofvi in any next state must be0, while if ci does not hold butc′i does hold,
then the value ofvi in the next state must be1. We introducek conditionsc1i , ..., c
k
i and
k conditionsc1′i , ..., c
k′




i is the conditionci written in terms of
the variablesV j.
For each pair〈ci, c′i〉 we introducek propositional formulas:











for 0 ≤ j < k. The propositional formula that represents the unfolded model is composed
of three parts:
• The initial conditionI, written in terms of the variablesV 0.
• The transition formulasT ji for 0 ≤ j < k.
• The negation of the specification:P = ¬p0 ∨¬p1 ∨¬p2 ∨ ...∨¬pk, wherepi is the
Boolean formulap written in terms of the set of variablesV i.
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The model and specification are therefore represented by the propositional formula:




We demonstrate the translation with the example below.
Example 7. We consider again the model given in Figure 2.1.
Simple model = (I, [〈v1 ∧ v2, v3〉, 〈¬v2, v1 ∧ ¬v1〉, 〈¬v1, v1〉])
overV = {v1, v2, v3} with I = ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ¬v3, and letϕ = AG(v1 ∨ v2). We choose
k = 4. To translate the model into a propositional formula for bound 4, we introduce 4
copies of the variables,V 1 = {v11, v12, v13}, ..., V 4 = {v41, v42, v43}. We first have to write
the initial conditionI in terms of the variablesV 0:
I = ¬v01 ∧ v02 ∧ ¬v03
Second, we build the propositional formulaP corresponding to the specification:
P = ((¬v01 ∧ ¬v02) ∨ (¬v11 ∧ ¬v12) ∨ (¬v21 ∧ ¬v22) ∨ (¬v31 ∧ ¬v32) ∨ (¬v41 ∧ ¬v42))
We now build the formulasT ji . For the next-state value ofv1 in time step 0, we have:
T 01 = ((v
0
1 ∧ v02) → ¬v11) ∧ ((¬(v01 ∧ v02) ∧ ¬v03) → v11)




1 will be the same asT
0
1 , with all the top indexes shifted.
For the next-state value ofv2 we get:
T 02 = (¬v02 → ¬v12) ∧ (v02 ∧ v01 ∧ ¬v01 → v12)
Note that the right hand side ofT 02 is equivalent toTrue, thus we getT
0
2 = (¬v02 → ¬v12).
Similarly, we haveT 12 = (¬v12 → ¬v22), T 22 = (¬v22 → ¬v32) andT 32 = (¬v32 → ¬v42).
For the last variablev3 we have:
T 03 = (¬v01 → ¬v13) ∧ (v01 → v13)
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3 are defined in the same way, with the top indexes shifted as above. The
propositional formula for the model, unfolded to depth 4 is then:
T 4Simple = I ∧ P ∧ T
0
1 ∧ T 11 ∧ T 21 ∧ T 31 ∧ T 02 ∧ T 12 ∧ T 22 ∧ T 32 ∧ T 03 ∧ T 13 ∧ T 23 ∧ T 33
In order to find a counterexample of lengthk or less, we need to find a satisfying
assignment forT 4Simple . SinceT
4
Simple is a propositional formula, a satisfiability
solver can now be applied to it. If no satisfying assignment exists, it means that no bug
can be found until cycle 4.
2.2 Description Logic
Description Logic [BCM+03] is a family of knowledge representation formalisms. It
has evolved from earlier knowledge representations, such asnetwork semantics[Qui67,
CQ69], andframes[Min81] in an attempt to overcome ambiguities in the semantics of
those formalisms.
In description logic, the basic elements aretomic conceptsandatomic roles. Atomic
concepts are unary predicate symbols, denoting sets of individuals; atomic roles are binary
predicate symbols, used to express relationships between individuals. Complex descrip-
tions of concepts and roles can be built from simpler ones by usingco structors. Different
dialects of Description Logic are distinguished by the constructors they allow. An impor-
tant feature of description logic is the ability toinfer about the described knowledge-base:
to find implicit facts from the explicit information given.
We present the formal syntax and semantics of different description logic dialects
in Section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 discusses how knowledge-bases are represented using
terminologies (Tboxes) and world descriptions (Aboxes). Section 2.2.3 then presents the
basic reasoning algorithm using tableau construction.
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2.2.1 Syntax and semantics
The basic description logic dialect that we use in this work is known asALC (for attribute
languagewith complement). In ALC, complex concepts are formed from simpler ones
using the following constructors, whereA is an atomic concept,C andD are concepts







The union operator is defined asC tD = ¬(¬C u¬D), and existential quantification
is defined as∃R.C = ¬∀R.¬C. The semanticsof ALC is defined with respect to a
structureI = (∆I , ·I), where∆I is a non-empty set, and·I is a function mapping every
atomic concept to a subset of∆I and every role to a subset of∆I × ∆I . Figure 2.4
presents the semantics ofALC constructors.
A AI ⊆ ∆I
R RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
> ∆I
⊥ ∅
¬C ∆I \ CI
C uD CI ∩DI
∀R.C {x ∈ ∆I |∀y.(x, y) ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}
Figure 2.4: The semantics ofALC
We review terminologies and reasoning procedures forALC in the next sections. In
Section 2.2.4 we define other DL dialects that are used in this document.
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2.2.2 Terminologies and world descriptions
Complex descriptions of concepts and roles are used to describe the classes of objects
of a given domain. The knowledge-base itself is composed of two components: ater-
minology(or Tbox) and aworld description(or Abox). The terminology gives a list of
axioms, that describe relations between concepts in the domain. In the most general case,
terminological axioms have the form of a concept inclusion
C v D,
whereC andD are concepts written in terms of a given dialect. The semantics of a
concept inclusion is as expected: an interpretationI satisfies the concept inclusionC v D
if CI ⊆ DI . Figure 2.5 presents a terminology with concepts about animals and their
eating habits. The second component of a knowledge-base, the Abox, lists assertions
Herbivore v ∀eats.¬Animal
Omnivore v ∃eats.Animal u ∃eats.¬Animal
Cow v Animal u Herbivore
Human v Animal u (Herbivore tOmnivore)
Figure 2.5: A Tbox with facts about eating habits
about individual names in a specific domain. These will be of the form
C(a) , R(b, c)
wherea, b, c are individual names in the domain,C a concept andR a role. The above
assertions state that is a member ofC and b, c are related byR. When an Abox is
present, an interpretationI should also map the individual names: each individuala will




Figure 2.6: An Abox
2.2.3 Reasoning
Different inference tasks come to mind when dealing with Description Logic. For exam-
ple, we can consider:
• Subsumption - is one concept more general than another:C v D?
• Consistency - does a given conceptC have an interpretation?
• Membership - is the individuali a member of a conceptC in all interpretations?
It turns out that the different inference tasks can all be reduced to the question ofc sis-
tency. We use |=dl C to indicate consistency in DL, to differentiate it from satisfaction
in the model checking world. Thus, the general consistency problem, with respect to a
Tbox T , asks ifT |=dl C holds; that is, if there exists an interpretationI such thatCI is
non-empty and such thatCI1 ⊆ CI2 holds for everyC1 v C2 in T .
Tableaux algorithms for consistency checking ofC with respect to a terminologyT ,
try to prove the consistency by demonstrating the existence of an interpretationI such that
CI is not empty and all the concept inclusions inT hold. This is done by syntactically
decomposingC, to derive constraints on the structure of such an interpretation. The
construction fails if the constraints include acl sh; that is, if some individualx must be
an element of bothD and¬D for some conceptD. The algorithm is designed in such a
way that it is guaranteed to terminate, and guaranteed to construct an interpretation if one
exists.
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In practice, the algorithm works on a labeled tree, called acompletion tree1, that has a
close correspondence to an interpretation forT andC. We assume that concepts are given
in negation normal form(NNF), where negations are allowed only on atomic concepts. A
concept can be transformed into an equivalent one in NNF by pushing negation inwards,
making use of de Morgan’s laws and the duality between existential and universal restric-
tions [HST00]. For a conceptC, we writennf(C) to denote the NNF ofC, write ¬̇C to
denote the NNF of¬C, andsub(C) to denote the set of all sub-concepts ofC (including
C) and their negations. For a TBoxT we definesub(T ) =
⋃
(CvD)∈T sub(C) ∪ sub(D).
Definition 8. Let T be anALC TBox andC a concept in NNF. Acompletion treefor C
with respect toT is a directed graphG = (V,E,L) where each nodex ∈ V is labelled
with a setL(x) ⊆ sub(T )∪ sub(C) and each edge〈x, y〉 ∈ E is labelled with a role name
L(〈x, y〉) ∈ RN .
If 〈x, y〉 ∈ E, theny is called asuccessorof x andx is called apredecessorof y.
If, in addition,R = L(〈x, y〉), theny is called anR-successorof x andx is called an
R-predecessorof y. Ancestoris the transitive closure of predecessor, anddescendantis
the transitive closure of successor.
G is said to contain aclashif for someA ∈ NC and nodex of G, {A,¬A} ⊆ L(x).
The tableaux algorithm for checking concept consistency ofC with respect toT starts
with the completion treeG = ({r0}, ∅,L) whereL(r0) = {nnf(C)}. G is then expanded
by repeatedly applying the expansion rules given in Figure 2.7, stopping if a clash occurs.
In order to ensure termination we need to restrict the creation of new nodes in the
completion tree. The notion ofblockingis used for this purpose.
Definition 9. A nodex is label blockedif it has an ancestory such thatL(x) ⊆ L(y).
In this case, we say thaty blocksx. A node isblockedif either it is label blocked or its
predecessor is blocked.
1We note that for more expressive DL dialects a completiongraphmay be needed.
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v-rule: if 1. C1 v C2 ∈ T , and
2. {¬̇C1, nnf(C2)} ∩ L(x) = ∅
then setL(x) = L(x) ∪ {C} for someC ∈ {¬̇C1, nnf(C2)}
u-rule: if 1. C1 u C2 ∈ L(x), and
2. {C1, C2} 6⊆ L(x)
then setL(x) = L(x) ∪ {C1, C2}
t-rule: if 1. C1 t C2 ∈ L(x), and
2. {C1, C2} ∩ L(x) = ∅
then setL(x) = L(x) ∪ {C} for someC ∈ {C1, C2}
∃-rule: if 1. ∃R.C ∈ L(x), x is not blocked, and
2. x has noR-successory with C ∈ L(y),
then create a new nodey with L(〈x, y〉) = R
andL(y) = {C}
∀-rule: if 1. ∀R.C ∈ L(x), and
2. there is anR-successory of x such thatC /∈ L(y)
then setL(y) = L(y) ∪ {C}
Figure 2.7: Tableaux expansion rules forALC
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When nodes in a branch of the completion tree resemble ancestor nodes, a block is
established to ensure that further applications of∃-rule are not applied to the blocked
nodes (and therefore ensure termination).
Definition 10. A completion treeG is calledcompleteif no expansion rule can be applied.
G is clash-freeif no node contains a clash.
A tableaux algorithmfor checking concept consistency of anALC conceptC with
respect to a TBoxT builds a completion tree forC. If a complete and clash-free tree can
be obtained, the algorithm returns “consistent”; otherwise, if it was unable to build such
a tree, it returns “unsatisfiable”.
Theorem 11. (decision procedure, [SS91]) The tableaux algorithm always terminates for
a givenALC conceptC and TBoxT , and returns “consistent” iffC is satisfiable with
respect to a TBoxT .
2.2.4 Other Dialects
We present additional DL dialects that are needed for our results in Chapter 3.
• Inverse roles (indicated by the letterI).
If R is a role, this construct allows us to define the concept∀R−.C, for any concept
C. Given a structureI = (∆I , ·I), the semantics is defined as(∀R−.C)I = {x ∈
∆I : ∀y.(y, x) ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}.
• Nominals (indicated byO).
This constructor allows the definition of a concept as a set of individuals:{s1, ..., sk}.
the semantics, given a structureI = (∆I , ·I), is as expected:({s1, ..., sk})I =
{(s1)I , ..., (sk)I}.
• Functional roles (indicated byF).
Allows defining some or all of the roles asfunctionals. If R is functional and
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Symbolic Model Checking using
Description Logic
We present a variety of encodings for symbolic model checking using Description Logic.
For all of those encodings the ontology constructed describes an error in the system, and
interpretations if found, provide legal paths from the initial state of the model to a buggy
state. Interpretations can thus serve as counterexamples.
In this chapter we give formulations of bounded model checking ofinvarianceprop-
erties, of the typeG(p), and in Chapter 4 we discuss unbounded model checking ofin-
evitabilityproperties (F(p)), wherep is a Boolean expression over the set of state variables
V . As explained in Section 2.1.2, allLTL properties can be translated into these types of
formula via the construction of a B̈uchi automaton. Note that theCTL formulasAG(p)
andAF(p) are equivalent to theLTL onesG(p) andF(p) respectively. We sometimes use
theCTL notation, since the description of an erroneous situation (EF(¬p) or EG(¬p)) is
easier inCTL.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we show how a model
descriptionMD can be represented as a TBoxTMD over the Description Logic dialect
ALC. We then prove several lemmas in Section 3.1.1, correlating interpretations satisfy-
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ing TMD with sub-models of the Kripke structureMMD described byMD . These lemmas
will be used later in this chapter to prove the correctness of our encodings. In Section
3.2 we present various ways of phrasing a bounded model checking problem as a consis-
tency problem in DL. The methods differ from each other in the DL dialects they use as
well as in the encodings themselves. We prove the correctness of our encodings in Sec-
tion 3.3, and in Section 3.4 we sketch an alternative symbolic representation of a model
description, and review the changes needed in all of the previously presented encodings.
Section 3.5 gives experimental results, and Section 3.6 concludes this chapter with a dis-
cussion.
3.1 Modeling A Kripke Structure as a TBox
We start by presenting a natural encoding of a model descriptionMD as a terminology
overALC. Let MD = (I, [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) be a model description for the model
MMD = (S, I, R, L), overV = {v1, ..., vn}, as defined in Section 2.1.1.
For each variablevi ∈ V we introduce one primitive conceptVi, whereVi denotes
vi = 1 and¬Vi denotesvi = 0. We introduce one primitive roleR corresponding to the
transition relation of the model. Given a Boolean expressionp ver the state variables
v1, ..., vn, we denoteD(p) the conceptP derived fromp by replacing eachvi in p with
Vi, and∨,∧,¬ with u,t,¬ respectively. For example, ifp = (¬v1 ∧ v2), thenD(p) =
(¬V1 u V2).
We define the conceptS0 to represent the set of initial states:S0 = D(I). We define
Ci = D(ci), C′i = D(c′i), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The TBoxTMD would consist of the following
concept inclusions, describing the model: for each pair〈ci, c′i〉we introduce the inclusions
Ci v ∀R.¬Vi
(¬Ci u C′i) v ∀R.Vi
Interpretations forTMD will consist of individuals that correspond to states in the
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systemMD . Note that in our DL translation, if an individualσ belongs to a conceptVi it
means that the variablevi has the value 1 in the corresponding states. The first inclusion
ensures that in any interpretation, an individual that belongs toCi can be related byRonly
to individuals that do not belong toVi. Since individuals correspond to states in the model
MMD , this means that whenci holds in a states, all neighbor states ofsmust havevi = 0.
The above inclusions thus restrict the roleR to agree with the definition ofR in the model
description. Note that for a model descriptionMD overn variables,TMD will consists of
only 2n concept inclusions.
As an example, consider the Kripke structureSimple presented in Figure 2.1. Its
MD is given asSimple = (I, [〈v1 ∧ v2, v3〉, 〈¬v2, v1 ∧ ¬v1〉, 〈¬v1, v1〉]) over V =
{v1, v2, v3} with I = ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ¬v3. We build a TBox TSimple for it. We intro-
duce three primitive conceptsV1,V2,V3 and one primitive roleR. Figure 3.1 below gives
the full TBox.
Note that for simplicity, we omitted the inclusion(¬¬V2 u V1 u ¬V1) v ∀R.V2 (corre-
S0 v ¬V1 u V2 u ¬V3
(V1 u V2) v ∀R.¬V1




Figure 3.1: The TBoxTSimple
sponding to¬Ci uC′i v ∀R.Vi for i = 2), since the prefix¬¬V2 u V1 u ¬V1 is equivalent
to⊥. Similarly, the concept¬¬V1 u V1 (corresponding to¬C3 uC′3) was replaced by the
equivalentV1.
In the subsection below we prove that interpretations ofTMD must correspond to sub-
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models of the Kripke structureMMD . The propositions presented here will be used later
in this chapter to prove the correctness of our encodings.
3.1.1 TBox Interpretations as sub-models ofM
Let MD = (I, [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) be a model description for the modelMMD =
(S, I, R, L), overV = {v1, ..., vn}, and letTMD be the TBox built for it as described
above. LetI = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation forTMD . We define a mappingM : ∆I → S
that relates individuals from∆I to states fromS.
Definition 12. M(σ) = s if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, σ ∈ VIi if and only if s |= vi.
Note thatM is a function, since a states is determined by the value of the variables
v1, ..., vn. The following lemma shows thatσ andM(σ) agree also on Boolean expres-
sions overv1, ..., vn.
Lemma 13. Let b be a Boolean expression overv1, ..., vn, andB = D(b) its corresponding
concept. Letσ ∈ ∆I be an element in the interpretationI, and lets = M(σ). Then
σ ∈ BI if and only if s |= b.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the Boolean expressionb.
Corollary 14. Let σ1, σ2 ∈ ∆I , M(σ1) = s1, M(σ2) = s2. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ RI then
(s1, s2) ∈ R.
Before we prove Corollary 14, we note that the other direction does not hold: if
(s1, s2) ∈ R in the systemMD it does not necessarily imply that(σ1, σ2) ∈ RI . To
see this, note that the concept inclusions inTMD do not enforce any ‘edge’ to exist in an
interpretation; they only assert conditions on edges, if they do exist. Thus, an interpreta-
tion that has no edges at all, would satisfy all concept inclusions ofTMD . Note also that
the direction stated in the corollary is the only one needed for our proofs.
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Proof of Corollary 14. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ RI , then sinceI is an interpretation forTMD we
know that∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (σ1 ∈ CIi implies σ2 ∈ ¬VIi andσ1 ∈ C′
I
i ∩ ¬CIi implies
σ2 ∈ Vi). But sinceCi = D(ci) andC′i = D(c′i), we get by Lemma 13, that∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(s1 |= ci impliess2 |= ¬vi ands1 |= c′i ∧ ¬ci impliess2 |= vi). By Definition 3 we get
that(s1, s2) ∈ R.
Corollary 15. Let I = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation forTMD , and letσ0, σ1, ..., σm be
individuals in ∆I , such that(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI . We define a sequence of stateswI =
s0, s1, ..., sm such thatM(σi) = si. ThenwI is a path inMMD .
Proof. Follows directly from Corollary 14.
Corollary 16. Let w = s0, s1, ..., sm be a path inMMD. Let Iw = (∆Iw , ·Iw) be a
structure derived fromw: ∆Iw = {σ0, σ1, ..., σm}, and·Iw maps the individuals in such a
way thatM(σi) = si and(σi, σi+1) ∈ RIw . ThenIw is an interpretation forTMD.
Proof. All the inclusions inTMD have the formCi v ∀R.¬Vi or (¬Ci u C′i) v ∀R.Vi.
We know that for alli, 1 ≤ i < n, (si, si+1) ∈ R. Thus, by the definition, for allj,
1 ≤ j ≤ n, (si |= cj impliessi+1 |= ¬vj andsi |= c′j ∧ ¬cj impliessi+1 |= vj). Since
by construction,M(σi) = si, we get by Lemma 13 that for allj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, (σi ∈ CIj
impliesσi+1 ∈ ¬VIj andσi ∈ C′
I
j ∩¬CIj impliesσi+1 ∈ Vj). Thus the pairs (σi, σi+1) obey
the concept inclusions ofTMD . Since these pairs are the only ones inRIw , the inclusions
hold under the interpretationIw.
Note that the TBox built so far describes only the model and does not consider the
specification to be verified. Legal interpretations include for example the empty interpre-
tation, and are not necessarily useful for verification. In order to use DL reasoning for
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model checking we need to add restrictions to the terminology to stand for the specifi-
cation. In all methods described in the sequel, we add concept inclusions or assertions
that describe abug in the model. Interpretations will therefore be legal sub-models that
demonstrate an erroneous behavior. In the section below we discuss safety properties.
Liveness properties are treated in Chapter 4.
3.2 The Different BMC methods
Letϕ = AG(p) be the formula to be verified, withp being a Boolean expression over the
state variablesv1, ..., vn. Recall that in bounded model checking of boundk, one tries to
refute the satisfaction ofAG(p) in the given model by presenting a path of lengthk or
less, that leads to a state where¬p holds. In order to encode this as a DL query, we use
the TBox TMD described in Section 3.1, and add two components to it, one describing a
bounded path and the other describing a buggy state. LetT kMD be the TBox representing
both the model and the bounded path, and letCϕ be a concept representing a bug. Model
checking is then carried out by asking the DL reasoner to determine whetherT kMD |=dl Cϕ.
If the answer is positive, it means that an interpretation is found forT kMD such thatCϕ is
not empty. Such an interpretation represents a counterexample.
Below we present four encodings of a bounded model checking problem as a consis-
tency query in DL. The methods we describe differ from each other by the way a bounded
path of lengthk is defined, and by the way the formula is represented. We demonstrate
each method on the exampleSimple presented in Figure 2.1.
1. UsingALC
For this method we use the terminologyTMD built in section 3.1, and add nothing
to encode a bounded path. Rather, we encode the possible existence of a bug at
distancek or less, as one concept inclusion. Letϕ = AG(p), andP = D(p) the
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concept representingp. We define the conceptC1ϕ as follows.
C1ϕ v S0 u (¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ...∃R.¬P)...)))
with k nested∃Rs.
As an example, consider the modelSimple , the boundk = 4 and the specification
ϕ = AG(¬v2∨¬v3). We buildTSimple as shown in Section 3.1, and the concept
C1ϕ as given below.
C1ϕ v S0u((V2uV3)t∃R.((V2uV3)t∃R.((V2uV3)t∃R.((V2uV3)t∃R.(V2uV3)))))
Verification will now take place by asking whetherTSimple |=dl C1ϕ.
2. UsingALCI.
Recall that the conceptS0 represents the set of initial states ofM . If S1 represents
states that can be reached in one step fromS0, then the concept inclusionS1 v
∃R−.S0 must hold (that is, the setS1 is a subset of all the states that can reachS0 by
going one step backwards using the relationR). Similarly, we denote bySi subsets
of the states reachable insteps from the set of initial states, and introduce the
inclusions
Si v ∃R−.Si−1
for 0 < i ≤ k. We call this set of concept inclusionsTk.
Forϕ = AG(p), let P = D(p) be the concept representingp. We define the concept
C2ϕ v ¬Pu (S0 t S1 t ... t Sk). If Cϕ is consistent with respect to the terminology
T kMD = Tk ∪ TMD , it means that¬p holds in a state with distancek or less from the
initial state. Model checking is thus reduced to the query:T kMD |=dl C2ϕ. A positive
answer from the DL reasoner indicates an error inMMD.
For the modelSimple , the boundk = 4 and the specificationϕ = AG(¬v2∨¬v3).
Figure 3.2 describesT 4Simple , the TBox representing both the model and bound.
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(V1 u V2) v ∀R.¬V1









Figure 3.2: The TBoxT 4Simple
For the specificationϕ = AG(¬v2 ∨ ¬v3) we getP ≡ ¬V2 t ¬V3, andC2ϕ v
¬Pu (S0 tS1 tS2 tS3 tS4). Verification is then carried out by asking the query:
Is the conceptC2ϕ consistent with respect toT 4Simple ?
3. UsingALCO and Aboxes.
The method described in item (2) above encodes a bounded path with a set of con-
cept inclusions, and thus usesinverse roles. We show how a bounded path, as well
as the formula to be checked can be encoded as a set of ABox assertions. For a
boundk, we introducek+1 individuals,s0, s1, ..., sk. The assertionS0(s0) makes
s0 an initial state, and for0 ≤ i < k, the assertionsR(s i,s i+1) makes i a state
of distancei from the initial state. We call this set of assertionsAk. In order to
verify the specificationϕ we usenominals. Forϕ = AG(p) we define the concept
P = D(p) as before, and define the conceptC3ϕ v ¬Pu {s0, ..., sk}. Verification
for this method is done by asking the query:(TMD ,Ak) |=dl C3ϕ.
For the exampleSimple , with boundk = 4 andϕ = AG(¬v2 ∨ ¬v3), we build
the ABox
A4 = {S0(s0),R(s0, s1),R(s1, s2),R(s2, s3),R(s3, s4)}
and the concept
C3ϕ v V2 u V3 u {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}
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Verification is done by asking the query(TSimple ,Ak) |=dl C3ϕ.
Note that the assertions inAk form a symbolic path of lengthk + 1 through the
model, starting from an initial states. Moreover, this syntactic definition of a path
does not depend on the model described in the TboxTMD .
4. UsingALCF and Aboxes.
This method encodes a bounded path as an ABox as described in item (3) above.
However, we use a special encoding for the formula, that involves enhancing both
the TBox and the ABox. It is based on two known facts. First, that ifAG(p) does
not hold in a model thenEF (¬p) does. Second, thatEF (p) has a fixpoint repre-
sentation (Clarke and Emerson’s [CE81]):
EF (p) ≡ p ∨ EX(EF (p))
That is, in order forEF (p) to hold in a state, eitherp should hold in the current
state, or there should exist a next state whereEF (p) holds. In order to encode this
in DL, we need to enhance both the TBox built in section 3.1 and the ABox de-
scribed in item (3) above.
We first defineR to be afunctional role, to ensure that each individual in the in-
terpretation has at most one outgoing edge throughR. We then add an assertion to
Ak:
¬∃R.>(sk)
forcingsk to be the last state in the interpretation (that is,sk has no outgoing edges).
We then build the TboxT ′MD by adding one concept inclusion toTMD . We introduce
a new conceptEFnotP , and define it as follows:
EFnotP v ¬Pt ∃R.EFnotP
This inclusion imitates exactly the fixpoint representation of Clarke and Emerson:
we first check whether¬P holds in the current state; if it does, then a bug was found
45
and we are done. If not, we try to perform the same check on the following states,
that are accessible via the roleR. SinceR is a functional, we have that∃R.EFnotP
is the same as∀R.EFnotP , and it is propagated to the next state. If¬P does not
hold in the last state,∃R.EFnotP is not applicable anymore, and the search stops
afterk steps.
Finally, we add another assertion toAk, stating thats0, the initial state, belongs
also to the new conceptEFnotP :
EFnotP (s0).
LetA′k = Ak∪{EFnotP (s0),¬∃R.>(sk)}, andT ′MD as defined above. If(T ′MD ,A′k)
is consistent, it means that¬p holds on one of the states of distancek or less from
the initial state.
For the exampleSimple , ϕ = AG(¬v2 ∨ ¬v3) andk = 4, we defineR to be a
functional role, and add the following inclusion to createT ′Simple :
EFnotP v (V2 u V3) t ∃R.EFnotP
We then add two assertions toA4:
A′4 = A4 ∪ {EFnotP (s0),¬∃R.>(s4)}
Verification is now carried out by asking whether(T ′Simple ,A
′
4) is consistent.
Note that as in the examples above, we expect the DL reasoner to give an “unsatis-
fiable” result (“inconsistent” for the other cases), since the formulaϕ actually holds
in Simple .
3.3 Correctness
We relate the satisfaction ofϕ in the modelMMD to the consistency problems stated in
the previous section. LetMD = (I, [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) denote a model description for
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a modelMMD = (S, I, R, L), let MkMD be the restriction ofMMD to distancek from
the initial states, and letϕ = AG(p) be a safety formula. LetTMD , T kMD , (TMD ,Ak),
(T ′MD ,A′k) be the ontologies built forMD as defined in items (1),(2),(3),(4) respectively




ϕ be the concepts representingϕ, as described in items
(1),(2),(3) of Section 3.2 (note that for method (4) noCϕ is defined). Theorems 17 and 18
state that our methods are correct.
Theorem 17. If MkMD 6|= ϕ then all the following hold:
1. TMD |=dl C1ϕ. 2. T kMD |=dl C2ϕ. 3.(TMD ,Ak) |=dl C3ϕ 4. (T ′MD ,A′k) is consistent.
Theorem 18. If one of the following holds:
1. TMD |=dl C1ϕ 2. T kMD |=dl C2ϕ 3.(TMD ,Ak) |=dl C3ϕ or 4. (T ′MD ,A′k) is consistent
thenMkMD 6|= ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 17. Assume thatMkMD 6|= ϕ. Then there exists a path inMkMD ,
w = s0, ..., sj, wherej ≤ k, such thats0 |= I, ∀l, 0 < l ≤ j, (sl−1, sl) ∈ R, andsj 6|= p.
We build a finite interpretationI = (∆I , ·I) for TMD , based onw. The set∆I includes
j + 1 elementsσ0, ..., σj. Each of the primitive conceptsVi is interpreted as a setVIi ,
such that∀l, 0 ≤ l ≤ j, σl ∈ VIi if and only if sl |= vi. Note that for this interpretation,
M(σl) = sl (whereM is as given in definition 12). The interpretationRI of the roleR is
a set of pairs(σl, σl+1), 0 ≤ l < j. By Corollary 16, we know that all concept inclusions
of TMD hold under this interpretation. Note further that sincesj 6|= p we get by Lemma 13
thatσj ∈ ∆I \ PI .
We consider each of the four methods separately.
1. We assignσ0 ∈ C1ϕ (whereσ0 is the individual corresponding tos0). We need to
show that the inclusion
C1ϕ v S0 u (¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ...∃R.¬P)...)))
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holds under the interpretationI. This is easy to see: first,σ0 ∈ S0, by the
mappingM and Lemma 13. Second, sinceσj ∈ ∆I \ PI and (σj−1, σj) be-
long to RI , we have thatσj−1 ∈ (∃R.¬P)I . For similar considerations, since
(σ0, σ1), (σ1, σ2), ..., (σj−2, σj−1) all belong toRI , we have that
σ0 ∈ (∃R.∃R....∃R︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
.¬P)I . We have shown an interpretation where all inclusions of
TMD hold, andC1ϕ is not empty, thusTMD |=dl C1ϕ.
2. We interpret each primitive conceptSl as {σl} for 0 ≤ l ≤ j. The primitive
conceptsSj+1, ...,Sk are interpreted as∅. We assignσj ∈ C2
I
ϕ . SinceT kMD =
TMD ∪ Tk, it remains to show that all concept inclusions ofTk hold under this
interpretation, and thatC2ϕ v ¬Pu (S0 t S1 t ... t Sk).
• Inclusions fromTk: For l > j, SIl = ∅, and are thus included in any other set.
In order forSl v ∃R−.Sl−1 to hold, for l ≤ j, we need to show thatSIl ⊆
{x ∈ ∆I | ∃y ∈ ∆I s.t.(y, x) ∈ RI ∧ y ∈ SIl−1}. Indeed,SIl = {σl},SIl−1 =
{σl−1}, (σl−1, σl) ∈ RI , and(σl−1, σl) is the only pair(x, y) ∈ RI such that
x ∈ SIl−1. Thus the inclusion holds.
• We need to show thatC2ϕ v ¬Pu(S0tS1t ...tSk) holds under the interpreta-
tion I. SinceSj = {σj}, we get thatσj ∈ (SI0 ∪SI1 ∪ ...∪SIk). Sincesj |= ¬p,
we get by Lemma 13 thatσj 6∈ PI . Thusσj ∈ (¬Pu (S0 tS1 t ...tSk))I as
needed.
3. We interpret the individuals0, ..., s j of Ak asσ0, ..., σj, that already exist in∆I .
We assignσj ∈ C3
I
ϕ , andσj is the only individual inC
3I
ϕ . For s j+1, ..., sk, we
introduce new individuals,σj+1, ..., σk. Sincesj 6|= p, we get by Lemma 13 that
σj 6∈ PI .
By the construction ofI, it satisfies bothTMD andAk. It remains to be shown that
C3ϕ v ¬Pu{s0, ..., sk} under the interpretationI. Sinces j is interpreted asσj and
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σj 6∈ PI , we get thatσj ∈ (∆I \ PI) ∩ {sI0 , ..., sIk} as needed.
4. We interpret the individuals0, ..., s j of Ak asσ0, ..., σj, as above. We map allσi,
0 ≤ i ≤ j, to belong toEFnotP . The assertions inA′k therefore hold:(sIi , sIi+1) ∈
RI , sI0 ∈ EFnotP I andsIk ∈ (∆I \ {e ∈ ∆I : ∃(e, e′) ∈ RI}) since there is
no outgoing edge fromsIk . It remains to be shown that the inclusionEFnotP v
¬Pt ∃R.EFnotP holds under the interpretationI. We know thatσ0, σ1, ..., σj ∈
EFnotP I , and only them. We have to show that these individuals belong also to the
right hand side of the inclusion.σ0, σ1, ..., σj−1 belong there since(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI ,
σi+1 ∈ EFnotP I for 0 ≤ i < j. Sinceσj 6∈ PI it also belongs there.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 17.
For the proof of Theorem 18, we need to show the opposite direction, that is, that if an
interpretation can be found for one of the ontologies, it means thatMkMD 6|= ϕ. The
following lemma, derived trivially from Lemma 13 and Corollary 15, shows that it is
enough to show, given an interpretation forTMD, that it includes a “bad” sequence of
individuals.
Lemma 19. Let I = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation forTMD. Let ϕ = AG(p) be a for-
mula andP = D(p). If there exist individualsσ0, σ1, ..., σj in ∆I , such thatσ0 ∈ SI0 ,
(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for 0 ≤ i < j, andσj 6∈ PI thenMkMD 6|= ϕ.
Proof. Let s0 = M(σ0), s1 = M(σ1),..., sj = M(σj). SinceI is an interpretation of
TMD , we know by Corollary 15, thats0, s1, ..., sj is a path inMkMD. Sinceσj 6∈ PI we
have thatsj 6|= p by Lemma 13. ThusMkMD 6|= ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 18. In all the cases, we assume that an interpretationI = (∆I , ·I)
exists, such that the given ontology holds. We then show, for each case that the axioms and
assertions imply the existence of a series of individuals,σ0, σ1, ..., σj such thatσ0 ∈ S0,
(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for 0 ≤ i < j, andσj 6∈ PI . This is enough by Lemma 19.
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1. We know that the inclusion
C1ϕ v S0 u (¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ...∃R.¬P)...)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
holds under the interpretationI, and thatC1ϕ is not empty. Letσ0 be an individual
in C1ϕ
I . Thenσ0 ∈ SI0 and alsoσ0 ∈
I
(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ...∃R.¬P)...)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
If σ0 ∈ PI then there must exist an individualσ1 such that(σ0, σ1) ∈ RI and
σ1 ∈
I
(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ∃R.(¬Pt ...∃R.¬P)...)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
. For similar considerations, there
must exist a series of individuals,σ2, σ3, ..., σj such thatj ≤ k, (σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for
1 ≤ i < j, andσj 6∈ PI . We have found a sequenceσ0, σ1, ..., σj such thatj ≤ k
σj 6∈ PI , and by Lemma 19,MkMD 6|= ϕ.
2. LetI = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation showing thatT kMD |=dl Cϕ is consistent. Since
CIϕ = (∆
I \ BI) ∩ (SI0 ∪ SI1 ∪ ... ∪ SIk) is not empty inI, it must be the case that
for somej, 0 ≤ j ≤ k, (∆I \ PI) ∩ SIj is not empty. Letσj be an element in
(∆I \ PI) ∩ SIj . Thenσj ∈ (∆I \ BI) and alsoσj ∈ SIj .
SinceT kMD includes the concept inclusionSj v ∃R−.Sj−1, andSIj is not empty, we
deduce thatSIj−1 is not empty, and that∃σj−1 ∈ SIj−1, such that(σj−1, σj) ∈ RI .
By similar considerations, there must exist a sequence of elementsσ0, ..., σj ∈ ∆I ,
such that for0 ≤ l < j, (σl, σl+1) ∈ RI , σ0 ∈ SI0 andσ0 6∈ PI . ThusMkMD 6|= ϕ.
3. LetI = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation showing that(TMD ,Ak) |=dl Cϕ is consistent.
SinceCϕ v ¬P u {s0, ..., sk} is not empty, we know thatsIj 6∈ PI for some
0 ≤ j ≤ k. Let σ0, σ1, ..., σj be the interpretation of{s0, ..., s j}. By the assertions
in Ak we know thatσ0 ∈ SI0 , (σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for 1 ≤ i < j andσj 6∈ PI as needed.
4. Let I = (∆I , ·I) be an interpretation showing that(T ′MD ,A′k) is consistent. Let
σ0, σ1, ..., σk be the interpretation of{s0, ..., sk}. By the assertions inA′k we have
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thatσ0 ∈ SI0 and alsoσ0 ∈ EFnotP I . SinceEFnotP I ⊆ ¬PI∪∃RI .EFnotP I we
know that eitherσ0 6∈ PI or there exists an elementγ ∈ ∆I such that(σ0, γ) ∈ RI ,
andγ ∈ EFnotP I . SinceR is a functional role,γ = σ1. For similar considerations,
eitherσ1 6∈ PI or σ2 ∈ EFnotP I , and the same applies toσi, 0 ≤ i < k. Sinceσk
has no outgoing edge, we get that one ofσ0, , σ1, ..., σk must belong to∆I \PI . Let
this element beσj.
We have found a sequenceσ0, , σ1, ..., σj such thatσ0 ∈ SI0 , (σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for
1 ≤ i < j andσj 6∈ PI as before, thusMkMD 6|= ϕ.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 18.
We now turn to investigate a different encoding to a model description as a TBox, that
gives rise to new BMC encodings.
3.4 Alternative Encodings
The methods described in the previous section all used the same encoding for the model,
which we denotedTMD . In this section we present an alternative encoding of a model,
based on the Ramsey-rule [Ram31]. Translated into DL notation, this rule states the
following equivalence:
Cv ∀R.D if and only if ∃R−.Cv D
Note that the roleR used inTMD is actually defined by the restrictions imposed by the
concept inclusions. We can therefore replaceRby a roleR̂, equivalent to the inverse ofR.
The model descriptionMD will be defined by the following inclusions, denoted̂TMD :
∃R̂.Ci v ¬Vi
∃R̂.(¬Ci u C′i) v Vi
Note thatT̂MD is defined overALC. Let ϕ = AG(p), andP = D(p). The four methods
of section 3.2 can now be adapted to use the TBoxT̂MD .
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ϕ v ¬Pu (S0 t ∃R̂.(S0 t ∃R̂.(S0 t ...∃R̂.¬S0)...)))
with k nested∃R̂s. Checking whether̂TMD |=dl Ĉ
1
ϕ performs a search backwards,
starting from a buggy state (that belongs to¬P), and trying to reach an initial state
in k or less steps.
2. Recall that for the second method we used concept inclusions to encode a bounded
path, that needed the inverse roles, thus using the dialectALCI. UsingR̂, we built
T̂k where onlyALC is needed:
Si v ∃R̂.Si−1
for 0 < i ≤ k. The encoding of the formula now stays the same:
Ĉ
2
ϕ v ¬Pu (S0 t S1 t ... t Sk)
As we see, for this method the alternative encoding allows us to avoid the use of
inverse roles.
3. As in the original encoding, for a boundk we introducek + 1 individuals,s0,s1
,...,sk. However, we encode the path and formula differently. We assert¬P(sk) to
say thatsk is a buggy state. For0 < i ≤ k, the assertionŝR(s i,s i−1) makes i a
state of distancek − i from the buggy state. We call this set of assertionsÂk. We
now want to use nominals to say that the initial state is reachable ink steps, going
backwards from the buggy statesk: Ĉ
3
ϕ v S0 u {s0, ..., sk}. Verification for this
method is done by asking the query:(T̂MD , Âk) |=dl Ĉ
3
ϕ.
4. As in section 3.2, for the fourth method we defineR̂ to be afunctional role, ensuring
that each individual in the interpretation has at most one outgoing edge throughR̂.
52
We use the same TBox and ABox as in item 3 above, but add to them. We add an
assertion toÂk:
¬∃R̂.>(s0)
forcings0 to be the last state in the interpretation (that is,s0 has no outgoing edges).
We then build the Tbox̂T ′MD by adding one concept inclusion tôTMD . We introduce
a new conceptEFs0, and define it as follows:
EFs0 v S0 t ∃R̂.EFs0
We now add another assertion tôAk, stating that thatsk, the buggy state, belongs
also to the new conceptEFs0:
EFs0(sk).
Like before, we first check whetherS0 holds in the current state - that is, if the buggy
state from which we start is already an initial state; if it is, then a bug was found in
an initial state (S0) and we are done. If not, we try to perform the same check on the
following states, that are accessible via the roleR̂. SinceR̂ is a functional, we have
that∃R̂.EFs0 is the same as∀R̂.EFs0, and it is propagated to the next state. IfS0
does not hold in the last state,∃R̂.EFs0 is not applicable anymore, and the search
stops afterk steps.
Let Â′k = Âk ∪ {EFs0(sk),¬∃R̂.>(s0)}, andT̂ ′MD as defined above. If(T̂ ′MD , Â′k)
is consistent, it means thatI can be reached ink or less steps from a buggy state.
3.5 Experimental Results
We conducted our experiments using theFaCT++ description logic reasoner [TH06].
While other DL reasoners exist, such asPellet [SPG+07] andRacer [HM01], we found
FaCT++ to be more accessible, being a free, open-source and well documented tool. A
benchmark comparison reported in [GHT06] suggests thatFaCT++ is also one of the
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leading tools in performance. The tool accepts three input languages. The DIG interface
language [BMC03] (defined by the Description Logic Implementation Group), the Owl-
DL language and a simple lisp-like input. We worked with the lisp-like input language.
We have experimented with the eight methods described in the previous sections, to com-
pare their performances. We used a model derived from the NuSMV example “dme1-16”,
taken from [NuS], parameterized to enable different model sizes, and ran our experiments
on an Intel XEON CPU of 1.8GHz, with a 4GB RAM and Cache size of 512 KB. In table
3.3 below we present run-time results for a model consisting of 85 state variables.
Size Bound SAT 1 1* 2 2* 3 3* 4 4*
85 5 0.02 0.02 1.13 1.77 5.3 0.05 125 0.18 –
85 6 0.03 0.03 1.38 287 48 0.08 – 0.25 –
85 7 0.04 0.03 4.3 – 104 0.18 – 0.34 –
85 8 0.05 0.04 59.31 – 604 0.6 – 0.44 –
85 9 0.05 0.05 – – – 2.61 – 0.55 –
85 10 0.05 0.05 – – – 34 – 0.68 –
85 15 0.08 0.11 – – – – – 5.85 –
85 17 0.09 0.12 – – – – – 10 –
85 20 0.12 59.72 – – – – – – –
85 30 0.22 – – – – – – – –
85 40 0.30 – – – – – – – –
Figure 3.3: Run times for BMC, small model
Time is given in seconds, and a result of ‘–’ indicates that the run did not terminate
within 1200 seconds. Column 2 gives theboundof the BMC run. Column 3 presents
the results of the same model and formula running using a SAT solver. For this, we
used the BMC mode of Cadence-SMV [McM], that invokedzChaff [MMZ +01] as a SAT
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solver. The columns titled with a number, each refer to the method with a similar number,
described in Section 3.2. The columns titled with a starred number (1*, 2* etc), refer to
the methods described in Section 3.4 (note that the starred methods are the Ramsey-rule
versions of the non-starred ones). Table 3.4 presents results for a larger model, consisting
Size Bound SAT 1 1* 2 2* 3 3* 4 4*
425 5 0.71 0.17 34 32 58 29.5 – 32 –
425 6 0.72 0.19 42 – 134 39.8 – 43.9 –
425 7 0.78 0.21 87 – 279 51.5 – 55.9 –
425 8 0.80 0.24 600 – 1275 63.8 – 69.4 –
425 9 0.88 0.28 – – – 95.9 – 83.8 –
425 10 0.93 0.34 – – – 703.6 – 99 –
425 15 1.04 0.79 – – – – – 423 –
425 17 1.50 1.15 – – – – – 630 –
425 20 2.34 314 – – – – – – –
425 30 2.76 – – – – – – – –
425 40 4.56 – – – – – – – –
Figure 3.4: Run times for BMC, large model
of 425 state variables. The verified formula was an invariant formula that failed on cycle
42. As evident from the table, none of our methods, for the large model as well as for
the small one, were capable of searching more than 20 cycles. Thus in all cases the result
from the DL reasoner was “unsatisfiable” (meaning that no error was found up to the
given bound).
The satisfiability solver we used,zChaff, outperformed all of our encodings as can be
seen in the tables. While some of these methods, especially number 1, performed well for
lower bounds, they all seem to be very sensitive to the depth of the search, and explode
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once the bound passes 20.
In all methods, except for number 2, the Ramsey-rule version performed much worse
than the original one. In the context of model checking this is not surprising, sinceback-
wards traversal of the transition relation is known to be more difficult than forward tra-
versal. The exception of Method 2 can be explained by the fact that the original method
in this case required backward traversal as well.
It is interesting to note the significant differences between the various DL encodings
themselves. While the gap between forward and backward encodings is expected due to
the nature of the model checking problem, the difference in performance between forward
encodings seems to be related to internal DL algorithms. In Chapter 6 we suggest possible
future directions to investigate this phenomena.
3.6 Discussion
It is interesting to compare a typical DL application to the model checking application pre-
sented above. The GALEN ontology [RN94] for example, contains close to 25,000 con-
cepts and around 500 concept inclusions, yet queries are resolved in a matter of minutes.
In contrast, the examples we use contain only a few hundred concepts and a similar num-
ber of concept inclusions, but for big enoughk the run does not terminate. The difference,
it seems, stems from the different “shape” of the problems. A typical DL application is
usually “shallow” in the sense that relations through roles are applied only once, while
the model checking application involves concepts that are defined using repeated relations
through one role.
The complexity of consistency checking with respect to a general terminology is
known to be EXP-time complete in all dialects used in this chapter [Sch91, DM00,
Tob01]. The complexity of model checking is known to be PSPACE-complete [SC85,
CES86]. At first sight then, it may look as if we try to solve a simple task with a complex
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algorithm. This is not the case however, for two main reasons.
First, we note that the complexity result for model checking is measured with respect
to the full Kripke structure (themodel) rather than themodel description, while consis-
tency checking complexity is given in terms of the terminology size. For our encoding,
the size of the terminology is linear in the size of the model description. The Kripke struc-
ture is in many cases exponentially larger than the description of it, and the main idea of
symbolic model checking is to avoid, when possible, the need to build the full Kripke
structure.
Second, it is important to note that while consistency checking is EXP-time complete
in general, the complexity is in NP for all the bounded model checking methods presented
above. To see this, letn = |MD| andk the bound. The size of the model description
isO(n + k). If an interpretation is given, (a ‘witness’ for the consistency query), it is of
sizeO(n × k) (k nodes, each of them of sizeO(n), assigning values to then primitive
concepts). Verifying that the given interpretation indeed satisfies all concept inclusions
will again amount toO(n × k) calculations. We conclude that, as known, complexity is




Liveness and Fairness Modeling using
Description Logic
In the previous chapter we explored several methods to encode a bounded model checking
problem of invariance formulas in DL. We now turn to considerlivenessformulas, given
asAF(p) with p being a Boolean expression. Such formulas state thatp must hold at least
once on every path. For a model descriptionMD , we use the same encoding as described
in Section 3.1, and here as well, we encode in our terminology a description of abuggy
path, and use the DL reasoner to find a counterexample for us. In the liveness case, a
buggy path would be one on whichp never holds. We thus look for a representation of
the formulaEG(¬p). As discussed in Section 2.1.2, liveness formulas are rarely verified
without some fairness constraints. In fact, for the main model checking method ofLTL,
a liveness formula is translated into a Büchi automaton [Var96], and model checking is
reduced to finding a “fair” loop.
In Section 4.1 below we give an encoding forAF(p) formulas overALC, and prove
its correctness. Section 4.2 deals with fairness encoding. We show that fairness cannot
be expressed inALC or other dialects discussed in this document, and demonstrate that
for our needs, fairness can be implemented on top of a tableau reasoning algorithm. In
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Section 4.3 we present experimental results, and Section 4.4 concludes this chapter with
a discussion.
4.1 The Encoding
As before, we use the fix-point representation ofCTL formulas, as defined by Clarke and
Emerson in [CE81] (see Section 2.1.3). Thus,EG(¬p) is represented as follows:
EG(¬p) = ¬p ∧ EX(EG(¬p)) (4.1)
We use this equation for our translation into DL. LetMD = (I, [〈c1, c′1〉, ..., 〈cn, c′n〉]) be
a model description for the modelMMD = (S, I, R, L) overV = {v1, ..., vn}, and let
TMD be the terminology built for it as described in Section 3.1. Letϕ = AF(p) be the
formula to be verified, withp being a Boolean expression over the variablesv1, ..., vn, and
let P = D(p).
We introduce a new concept calledEGnotP , and add the following concept inclusion
to TMD :
EGnotP v ¬Pu ∃R.EGnotP (4.2)
Note that the expression∃R.C can be seen as taking one step throughR, and thus corre-
sponds, in a sense, to theCTL expressionEX(C).
Let T FMD be the terminology we get by adding Equation (4.2) toTMD . We define the
conceptCϕ v S0uEGnotP . In order to verifyϕ, we now check whetherCϕ is consistent
with respect to our terminology:T FMD |=dl Cϕ ?
A positive answer from the DL reasoning tool will be accompanied by an interpretation
for T FMD in which Cϕ is not empty. This interpretation can serve an a witness toEG(¬p),
or as a counterexample toAF(p). The following proposition states our result formally.
Proposition 20.MMD 6|= ϕ if and only if T FMD |=dl Cϕ.
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Proof. (=⇒). Assume thatMMD 6|= ϕ. SinceMMD is a finite kripke structure, this means
there exists a loop, that is, a sequence of statess0, s1, ... ,sm such thats0 |= I, si 6|= p for
0 ≤ i ≤ m, (si, si+1) ∈ R for 0 ≤ i < m, andsm = sj for some0 ≤ j < m. We use
this sequence to build an interpretationI = (∆I , ·I) for T FMD . We definem individuals
σ0, σ1, ..., σm−1 in ∆I , that correspond tos0, s1, ... ,sm−1. We mapσi ∈ EGnotPI
for 0 ≤ i < m. We then map eachσi to the primitive conceptsVIk according tosi as
expected:σi ∈ VIk if and only if si |= vk. Note that sinces0 |= I we get by Lemma 13
thatσ0 ∈ SI0 , and alsoσi 6∈ PI for 0 ≤ i < m, sincesi 6|= p. We define(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI
for 0 ≤ i < m − 1, and also(σm−1, σj) ∈ RI . Finally, we mapσ0 ∈ EGnotPI . We
need to show that all inclusion inT FMD hold under this interpretation. By Corollary 16, we
know that all inclusions fromTMD hold.
• For the inclusionEGnotP v ¬Pu ∃R.EGnotP , note that by the construction of
I, all individualsσi belong toEGnotPI . We know also thatσi 6∈ PI . Since each
individual has an outgoing edge that is also inEGnotPI the inclusion holds.
• The inclusionCϕ v S0uEGnotP holds, sinceσ0, the only individual inCϕ, belongs
also toSI0 ∩ EGnotPI .
(⇐=). Assume thatT FMD |=dl Cϕ. Then there exists an interpretation forT FMD , such that
CIϕ is not empty. SinceALC enjoys thefinite model property[BCM+03], there must exist
a finite interpretationI = (∆I , ·I) for T FMD such thatCIϕ is not empty. Thus there exists
an individualσ0 ∈ SI0 ∩ EGnotPI .
Sinceσ0 ∈ EGnotPI andEGnotPI ⊆ (∆I \ PI) ∩ {e ∈ ∆I : ∃(e, e′) ∈ RI s.t. e′ ∈
EGnotPI} we know thatσ0 6∈ PI , and there must existσ1 ∈ EGnotPI such that
(σ0, σ1) ∈ RI . For similar considerations, there exists a sequence of individuals,σ0, σ1, σ2, ...,
such thatσi ∈ EGnotPI , σi 6∈ PI , and(σi, σi+1) ∈ RI for all i. SinceI is finite there
must existm, j such thatσm = σj. We show thatMMD 6|= ϕ by presenting an infinite
sequence of states (a loop) inMMD that do not satisfyp. We map eachσi to a statesi as
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usual:σi ∈ VIk if and only if si |= vk. By Lemma 13,si 6|= p, sinceσi 6∈ PI . Also, by
Corollary 14,∀0 ≤ i ≤ m, (si, si+1) ∈ R and(sm, sj) ∈ R.
4.1.1 Other Attempts
We consider two related attempts that can be tempting to be tried.
• It is interesting to try the Ramsey-rule method for encoding a model description
(Section 3.4). Recall that using this method, we encode a roleR̂ that goes back-
wards, equivalent to the inverse of the roleR. For the BMC methods of Section 3.4,
we used this method to go backwards from a buggy state, trying to reach an initial
state within the given bound. In our case however, there is no buggy state, as a
failure can be demonstrated only by a buggy loop. Suppose that equation 4.2 is
changed a bit, to usêR:
̂EGnotP v ¬Pu ∃R̂. ̂EGnotP
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the difference between the conceptsEGnotP and ̂EGnotP .
The left hand side of the figure describeEGnotP : individuals in which¬p holds,
Figure 4.1: Forward vs. backward role modeling
and in all the other individuals reachable throughR , ¬p holds also. The right hand
side describeŝEGnotP : individuals that when going backwards throughR (that is,
forward througĥR) can visit only individuals with¬p. For model checkingAF(p),
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we check the consistency ofS0 u EGnotP , that is check whether one of the ini-
tial states belong toEGnotP . If that is the case it means that a loop with¬p is
reachable from the initial state. We note thatS0 u ̂EGnotP would not, in general,
give us the correct answer. Only if the individual in the intersection is part of the
loop. Otherwise the answer would be wrong. Thus we can get a “false negative”
if S0 u ̂EGnotP is found to be inconsistent, although a state might exist in the left
“tail”, that is not included in ̂EGnotP . We can also get a “false positive”, if the
intersection is not empty because it includes an individual from the right tail, which
actually does not lead to a legal loop.
• It is tempting to try and use the same reasoning to verify a formulaψ = AG(p):
instead of the concept inclusion in (4.2), add the conceptAGpand the following
concept inclusion:
AGpv Pu ∀R.AGp. (4.3)
DefineCψ v S0 u AGp. Let T F ′MD be the terminology we get by replacing Equation
(4.2) with Equation (4.3) inT FMD . Note that checkingT F ′MD |=dl Cψ does not give
us what we want. To see this, recall thatT F ′MD |=dl Cψ asks whetherthere existsan
interpretationI, that satisfies all concept inclusions inT F ′MD , and for whichCψ is
not empty. Such interpretation does not necessarily include all possible transitions
in the given modelMMD . In fact, an interpretation that satisfies inclusion (4.2)
would be enough for inclusion (4.3) as well. ThusT F ′MD |=dl Cψ verifiesEG(p) and
notAG(p).
The encoding we have presented so far does not account for fairness constraints. This
is the topic of the next section.
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4.2 Modeling Fairness
In Section 2.1.2 we explained that fairness constraints are an important component in
model checking of liveness formulas. The constraintfairness p asserts that the live-
ness formula should be verified only on infinite paths on whichp holds infinitely often. In
order to encode fairness, we need to expresseventuality- that some event can be reached
within a finite number of steps. Providing a general encoding for this (as done for a
bounded path in Section 3.2), is not possible in the DL dialects that were considered so
far (subsets ofALCIOF). To see this, recall thatALCIOF corresponds to a fragment
of first order logic. Eventuality, needed for fairness, is equivalent toreachability, which
cannot be expressed in first order logic (c.f. [MR04]).
More expressive dialects have been defined in the DL literature that can deal with our
problem. In [GL97], De Giacomo and Lenzerini propose the embedding of aµ calculus
operator to DL, introducing the dialectµALCQ. In a joint work with Calvanese [CGL99]
they later expand this dialect to support inverse roles as well as roles with arbitrary arity,
introducing the dialectDLRµ. While they provide an algorithm to decide consistency
problems written in these dialects (using tree automata), those algorithms were never
implemented in any existing DL reasoning tool [TW08].
We observe that while fairness cannot be expressed inALCIOF , it can be easily
implemented. In order to find an interpretation for our encoding of liveness properties
overALC (Section 4.1), the mechanism ofblocking [HS99] comes into play (see Sec-
tion 2.2.3): an interpretation is found when a new nodey in the expansion is a subset of
a previous nodex (in this case we say thaty is blocked byx)1. Such an interpretation
demonstrates a loop, or, translated into the model checking world, an infinite sequence of
states. In order to support, for example, the fairness constraintfair ess p we need to
make sure that at least one of the nodes in the loop has (or can possibly have)p in it. That
is, we allowx to blocky only if p appears in some node on the path fromx to y .
1Other blocking conditions may apply for more expressive DL dialects.
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Below we show how fairness can be achieved in tableau based DL reasoning. We
assume that the formula to be verified is of the formAF(false ) (or EG(true )), meaning
that model checking is reduced to finding a fair cycle.
4.2.1 Realizing Fairness in Tableaux Reasoning
We propose a modification to the tableaux procedure to support fairness. Our procedure
is both terminating and sound: if a fair cycle is found, it is a correct one. However, the
procedure is not complete, that is, there are cases were a fair cycle exits but our procedure
fails to find it. We show that by an iterative application of the algorithm, completeness
can also be achieved. In the remainder of this section we discuss the theoretical and
implementation considerations for realizing fairness in DL reasoning.
As discussed before, fairness constraints in model checking are Boolean expressions
that should be satisfied at least once in a given loop in order for it to be a legal coun-
terexample. The algorithm we present deals with one fairness constraint; if more than
one constraint should be considered, a repeated application of the algorithm would be
required.
In tableaux reasoning, an interpretation is represented by a completion tree (see Sec-
tion 2.2.3), and cycles are represented by blocked nodes. If a nodey is blocked by a node
x0 then there exists a path of nodesx0, x1 . . . , xn, y in the completion tree, such that each
edge〈x0, x1〉, . . . , 〈xn, y〉 is labeled withR. (note that in the terminologies that we deal
with there exists only one roleR). Such a blocking path represents a loop.
In order to implement reasoning with fairness, we need to reject those completion trees
that correspond to unfair computations. LetFC be a fairness constraint. A completion
treeG is unfair with respect toFC if there exists a loopx0, . . . , xn, y such thatFC /∈
L(xi) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Otherwise, we say thatG is fair with respect toFC.
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Modifying Tableaux to Support Fairness
Our approach to implementing fairness is to build a complete and clash-free completion
tree and, if it is unfair, to attempt to make it fair by adding the fairness constraint to the
label of some node involved in a cycle. To accomplish this, the tableaux algorithm is
extended with the new rule illustrated in Figure 4.2. We set the new rule to have a lower
priority than all existing rules.
fairness-rule: if 1. y is a node blocked byx0 (let (x0, . . . , xn, y) be the cycle )
2. FC is a fairness constraint such that for everyi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, FC /∈ L(xi)
then setL(xi) = L(xi) ∪ {FC} for somei : 0 ≤ i ≤ n
Figure 4.2: Expansion rule for fairness
The tableaux algorithm is enhanced in such a way that a node is not consideredblocked
until a fairness constraint appears in the label of one of its nodes. Note that after applying
thefairness-rule the completion tree must be updated: a clash may now exist that did
not exist before, and labels of nodes may need to change.
Theorem 21. The tableaux algorithm withfairness-rule terminates and is sound (if a
complete clash-free fair completion tree forC is found thenC is consistent).
Proof. The algorithm is clearly sound: if a cycle is found whereFC holds on one of the
nodes then a fair cycle exists. To prove termination, we assume, without loss of generality,
that the completion tree is a single path. After a first application offairness-rule to a
given blocking loop, there are three cases to consider:
1. It is possible to compute a complete clash-free fair completion tree without a need
for a second application offairness-rule.
2. A clash occurs before a second application of thefairness-rule, or
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3. A subsequent application offairness-rule is required.
Both cases (1) and (2) lead to termination. Case (3) implies that the addition ofFC to
a label inside the cycle breaks the blocking condition and leads to a new cycle. The al-
gorithm therefore proceeds by addingFC inside the next loop. Again, there are three
possible outcomes, with two resulting in termination. In the worst case, there is a se-
quence of case (3) for which addingFC forces unblocking the last node and moving the
blocking loop forward. However, after a finite number of occurrences of case (3), there
must eventually be two nodes labeled byFC for which the labels are the same (since the
TBox is finite). One of these nodes will then block the other, and the fair loop must then
be established.
Note that while our algorithm is sound, completeness is not guaranteed. That is, there
can be cases where a concept is satisfiable with respect to a fairness constraintFC, bu the
tableaux procedure fails to find an interpretation. To see how this happens, let us consider
the example shown in Figure 4.3, that presents two completion trees for the conceptC
Figure 4.3: Two completion trees forT1
with respect to the TBoxT1 = {Cv ¬B,> v ∃R.>}.
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ObviouslyT1 |=dl C, since there exists a complete and clash-free completion treeG
for it as illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 4.3. OnG, the nodey is blocked by
x0. If we add the fairness constraintFC = B, thefairness-rule will try to addB to the
only possible node,x0, resulting in a clash. Our tableau algorithm will therefore return an
“unsatisfiable” result.
A clash-free fair completion tree forC does exist, however, as shown byG′ in Fig-
ure 4.3. In order to find it though, we need to allow for a longer blocking cycle. In the
definition below, we introduce the notion ofn-blocking.
Definition 22. Letn be a non-negative integer. A nodey isn-blockedby the nodex0 with
blocking loopx0, . . . , xm, y if y is blocked byx0 andn ≤ m, that is, there are at leastn
nodes in the blocking loop.
Figure 4.3 gives examples for 0-blocking according to Definition 22 (the completion
treeG), as well as 1-blocking (G′).
Note that replacing the original tableaux blocking withn-blocking in the (fair) tableaux
algorithm would clearly preserve both termination and soundness. Based onn-bl cking,
we can now propose a tableaux algorithm that would guarantee completeness, for loop
lengths less than or equal ton.
Algorithm 23. Given a conceptC, a TBoxT , a fairness conditionFC and a non-negative
integern, check the unfair consistency ofC with respect toT using the regular tableaux
procedure. If it is unsatisfiable, return “unsatisfiable”. Then, for0 ≤ k ≤ n, run the fair
tableaux algorithm withk-blocking. Return “satisfiable” if a fair loop is found for some
k; otherwise return “unsatisfiable”.
Theorem 24. Algorithm 23 is a sound and complete decision procedure for the fair sat-
isfaction ofCwith respect toT andFC, with loops up to lengthn.
Proof. Termination and soundness are a simple consequence of Theorem 21. Complete-
ness follows from the fact that no fair blocking loops for any possible length not exceeding
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n were found.
Note that for a Kripke structureM and a liveness specificationϕ there existsn such
that if M 6|= ϕ, thenM contains a fair cycle with length not exceeding(sinceM is
finite). Thus, it is possible to build the TBoxT using the technique from Section 4.1 and
run the procedure suggested in Algorithm 23 to determine if a fair cycle exists.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
The modified tableaux reasoning procedure described above was implemented by Dmitry
Tsarkov on top ofFaCT++ [TH06], a state-of-the-art description logic reasoner. In order
to run real examples, we wrote a translator from the AIGER [Bie07] format, that builds a
terminology as described in Section 4.1. Liveness formulas were translated in the AIGER
models into B̈uchi automata (see section 2.1.2), and the fairness constraints were passed
to FaCT++ using a new construct in the interface language.
The models we acquired were originally written in theVIS [BHSV+96] input lan-
guage, and were translated into AIGER using different tools. We present results running
three sets of benchmarks with fairness constraints. The “amba” benchmark encodes an
Advanced High Performance Bus. The “vsa” benchmarks encode a simple architecture
for a microprocessor. In each of the vsa benchmarks, the number indicates the datawidth
of the microprocessor. The “Vending” example is part of theVIS distribution.
Figure 4.4 summarizes our results. Times reported are in seconds and a time of ’–’
indicates that the run did not finish in the allotted time of 1 hour.
It is evident from Figure 4.4 that our approach is efficacious in certain scenarios. For
the “amba” benchmark, our system could not finish in the given time, whileVIS was
easily able to handle it in a fraction of a second. However, the “vsaR” benchmarks proved
simple for our reasoner whileVIS was unable to finish in the given time.
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Benchmark Result Size (vars) FaCT++ VIS
vsaR - 6 Fail 170 10.8s –
vsaR - 8 Fail 204 14.4s –
vending Pass 64 – 1.1s
amba2 - G3 Pass 63 – 0.7s
amba3 - G3 Pass 77 – 17.7s
Figure 4.4: Run times for the fairness verification tasks
4.4 Discussion
Our method can be seen as “bounded” fair cycle detection, where at each iteration we look
for loops of length not shorter than a given boundn. In this aspect it resembles bounded
model checking of liveness properties using satisfiability solving. The search algorithm
is different however. While our method dynamically searched for a fair loop, in the SAT
case a CNF formula is statically created prior to the SAT run, encoding all possible loops
up to a given length.
Our method works better when a fair cycle does exist in the model. Note that when a
fair cycle does not exist, the boundon the length of the longest loop is an inadequate
over-approximation of the real limit. Our algorithm would thus continue iterating longer
than needed before it would reach the conclusion that a fair cycle does not exist. This
can be also observed in the results presented in the previous section: when a formula is
satisfied (no fair cycle exists), our method performs much worse thanVIS, but becomes




An important feature of model checking tools is their ability to provide, when the specifi-
cation does not hold in a model, acounterexample[CGMZ95]: a trace that demonstrates
the failure of the specification in the model. This allows the user to analyze the failure,
understand its source(s), and fix the specification or model accordingly. In many cases,
however, the task of understanding the counterexample is challenging, and may require a
significant manual effort.
An explanation of a counterexample deals with the question:what values on the trace
cause it to falsify the specification?Thus, we face the problem ofcausality. The philoso-
phy literature, going back to Hume [Hum39], has long been struggling with the problem
of what it means for one event to cause another. We relate the formal definition of causal-
ity of Halpern and Pearl [HP01] to explanations of counterexamples. The definition of
causality used in [HP01], like other definitions of causality in the philosophy literature,
is based oncounterfactual dependence. EventA is said to be acauseof eventB if, had
A not happened (this is the counterfactual condition, sinceA did in fact happen) thenB
would not have happened. Unfortunately, this definition does not capture all the subtleties
involved with causality. The following story, presented by Hall in [Hal02], demonstrates
some of the difficulties in this definition. Suppose that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks
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and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both
throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have shattered the bottle had it not been pre-
empted by Suzy’s throw. Thus, according to the counterfactual condition, Suzy’s throw
is not a cause for shattering the bottle (because if Suzy wouldn’t have thrown her rock,
the bottle would have been shattered by Billy’s throw). Halpern and Pearl deal with this
subtlety by, roughly speaking, takingA to be a cause ofB if B counterfactually depends
onA under some contingency. For example, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the bottle shat-
tering because the bottle shattering counterfactually depends on Suzy’s throw, under the
contingency that Billy doesn’t throw.
We adapt the causality definition of Halpern and Pearl from [HP01] to the analysis of
a counterexample traceπ with respect to a temporal logic formulaϕ. We view a trace as a
matrix of values, where an entry(j, i) corresponds to the value of variablei at timej. We
look for those entries in the matrix that are causes for the first failure ofϕ onπ, according
to the definition in [HP01]. To demonstrate our approach, let us consider the following
example.
Example: A transaction begins whenSTARTis asserted, and ends whenENDis asserted.
Some unbounded number of time units later, the signalSTATUSVALID is asserted. Our
specification requires that a new transaction must not begin before theSTATUSVALID
of the previous transaction has arrived. This specification can be written in LTL as
G(START → (¬ENDU (END∧X[¬STARTU STATUSVALID ]))).
A counterexample for this specification may look like the computation pathπ s own
in Fig. 5.1.
In this example, the failure of the specification on the trace is not trivially evident. Our
explanations, displayed asdotsattract the user’s attention to the relevant places, to help
in identifying the failure. Note that each dotr is acauseof the failure ofϕ on the trace:
switching the value ofr would, under some contingency on the other values, change the
value ofϕ on π. For example, if we switch the value ofSTARTin state 15 from 1 to 0,
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Figure 5.1: A counterexample with explanations
ϕ would not fail on the given trace anymore (in this case, no contingency on the other
values is needed). Thus the matrix entry of the variableSTARTat time 15 is indicated as
a cause.
We show that the complexity of detecting an exact causal set is NP-complete, based
on the complexity result for causality in binary models ( [EL01]). We then present an
over-approximation algorithm whose complexity is linear in the size of the formula and
in the length of the trace.
5.1 Defining Causality in Counterexamples
A counterexampleto anLTL formulaϕ in a Kripke structureK is a computation path
π = s0, s1, . . . such thatπ 6|= ϕ. For a statesi and a variablev, the labeling functionL
of K maps the pair〈si, v〉 to {0, 1} in a natural way:L(〈si, v〉) = 1 if si |= v, and0
otherwise. For a pair〈s, v〉 in π, we denote by〈ŝ, v〉 the pair that is derived from〈s, v〉
by switching the labeling ofv in s. Let π be a path,s a state inπ andv a variable in the
labeling function. We denoteπ〈ŝ,v〉 the path derived fromπ by switching the labeling of
v in s on π. This definition can be extended for a set of pairsA: we denoteÂ the set
{〈ŝ, v〉|〈s, v〉 ∈ A}. The pathπÂ is then derived fromπ by switching the value ofv in s
for all pairs〈s, v〉 ∈ A.
One of the ways to define causality is to use the definition ofcriticality: eventA is
critical for eventB if, hadA not occurred,B would not occur. EventC is then defined
to be acauseof eventB if C can be madecritical for B by, possibly, changing some
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conditions. Adapting this definition to causality in counterexamples, we want to say that
the value of variablev in states is critical for the failure ofϕ onπ if, after switching this
value,ϕ does not fail onπ any longer.
Before we formally define causes in counterexamples we need to deal with one sub-
tlety: the value ofϕ on finite paths. While computation paths are infinite, it is often
possible to determine thatπ 6|= ϕ after afinite prefix of the path. Thus, a counterexam-
ple produced by a model checker may demonstrate a finite execution path. We use the
notationπ[0..k] |=fϕ to denote “finitely models”, andπ[0..k] |=/fϕ for “finitely falsifies”.
These are defined as follows.
Definition 25 (Evaluation on finite paths). Let π[0..k] be a finite path andϕ an LTL
formula. We say that:
1. The value ofϕ is true in π[0..k] (π[0..k] |=fϕ) iff for all infinite computationsρ, we
haveπ[0..k] · ρ |= ϕ
2. The value ofϕ is falsein π[0..k] (π[0..k] |=/fϕ) iff for all infinite computationsρ, we
haveπ[0..k] · ρ 6|= ϕ;
3. The value ofϕ in π is unknown (π[0..k] ? ϕ) iff there exist two infinite computa-
tionsρ1 andρ2 such thatπ[0..k] · ρ1 |= ϕ andπ[0..k] · ρ2 6|= ϕ.
Before we define criticality and causality in counterexamples, we note that only part
of the values in a counterexample can be relevant for the explanation. We thus need the
definition below.
Definition 26 (Bottom value). For a Kripke structureK = (S, I, R, L), a pathπ in K,
and a formulaϕ, a pair〈s, v〉 is said to have abottom valuefor ϕ in π, if L(〈s, v〉) = 0
andv has apositivepolarity inϕ, orL(〈s, v〉) = 1 andv has anegativepolarity inϕ.
Note that a variablev may appear in different polarities in a formulaϕ. In such a case,
we say that〈s, v〉 has a bottom value for every states.
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Let ϕ be anLTL formula that fails on an infinite pathπ = s0, s1, . . ., and letk be the
smallest index such thatπ[0..k] |=/fϕ. If ϕ does not fail on any finite prefix ofπ, we take
k = ∞ (thenπ[0..∞] naturally stands forπ, and we haveπ 6|= ϕ).
In the definitions of criticality and causality given below, we assume thatk is he smallest
index such thatπ[0..k] |=/fϕ.
Definition 27 (Criticality in counterexample traces). A pair 〈s, v〉 is critical for the failure
of ϕ onπ[0..k] if π[0..k] |=/fϕ, but eitherπ〈ŝ,v〉[0..k] |=fϕ or π〈ŝ,v〉[0..k] ? ϕ.
That is, switching the value ofv in s changes the value ofϕ onπ[0..k] (to eithertrue
or unknown). As a simple example, consider the formulaϕ = Gp, on π = s0, s1, s2,
labeledp · p · ¬p. Then,π[0..2] |=/fϕ, and〈s2, p〉 is critical for this failure, since switching
the value ofp in states2 changes the value ofϕ to unknown.
Definition 28 (Causality in counterexample traces). A pair 〈s, v〉 is acauseof the failure
of ϕ onπ[0..k] if there exists a setA of bottom-valuedpairs, such that the following hold:
• 〈s, v〉 6∈ A,
• πÂ[0..k] |=/fϕ, k is the smallest such index, and
• 〈s, v〉 is critical for the failure ofϕ onπÂ[0..k].
A pair 〈s, v〉 is defined to be acausefor the failure ofϕ on π, if it can be made
critical for this failure by switching the values of some bottom-valued pairs. Note that
according to this definition, only bottom-valued pairs can be causes. The restriction of
allowed changes to bottom-valued pairs is important, since other changes of values may
introduce new failures that did not exist on the original counterexample, and thus can lead
to “spurious causes” - pairs that are not causes of the original failure, but can be made
critical if new failures are introduced. Consider, for example, the formulaψ1 = G(req →
Xack) and the traceρ1 pictured in Figure 5.2. It is clear that the value ofreq in s0 is not
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a cause for the failure ofψ1, since this request is acknowledged. If we allow changes of
any pairs, it is easy to see that〈s0, req〉 is a cause for the failure ofψ1 because changing
the value ofreq in s2 and ofack in s1 makes it critical.
Note that a traceπ may demonstrate more than one failure ofϕ, as we demonstrate
in the examples below. We believe that the first failure is the most interesting one for the
user. Also, focusing on one failure naturally reduces the set of causes, and thus makes it
easier for the user to understand the explanation.
Examples:
1. Considerϕ1 = G p and a pathπ1 = s0, s1, s2, s3, (s4)ω labeled as(p) · (p) · (¬p) ·
(¬p) · (p)ω. The shortest prefix ofπ on whichϕ1 fails isπ1[0..2]. 〈s2, p〉 is critical
for the failure ofϕ on π[0..2], because changing its value from0 to 1 changes the
value ofϕ on π[0..2] from false to unknown. Also, there are no bottom-valued
pairs inπ[0..2], thus there are no other causes, which indeed meets our intuition.
2. Considerϕ2 = F p and a pathπ2 = (s0)ω = (¬p)ω. The formulaϕ2 fails in π2, yet
it does not fail on any finite prefix ofπ2. Note that changing the value of any〈si, p〉
for i ≥ 0 results in the satisfaction ofϕ on π, thus all pairs{〈si, p〉 : i ∈ IN} are
critical and hence are causes for the failure ofϕ2 onπ2.
3. The following example demonstrates the difference between criticality and causal-
ity. Considerϕ=G(a ∧ b ∧ c) and a traceπ3 = s0, s1, s2, . . . labeled as(∅)ω (see
Figure 5.2). The formulaϕ3 fails ons0, however, changing the value of any signal in
one state does not change the value ofϕ3. There exists, however, a setA of bottom-
valued pairs whose change makes the value ofa in s0 critical: A = {〈s0, b〉, 〈s0, c〉}.
Similarly, 〈s0, b〉 and〈s0, c〉 are also causes.
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Figure 5.2: Counterexample traces.
5.2 Complexity of computing causality in counterexam-
ples
The complexity of computing causes for counterexamples follows from the complexity of
computing causality in binary causal models defined in [HP01].
Lemma 29. Computing the set of causes for falsification of a linear-time temporal speci-
fication on a single trace is NP-complete.
Proof. The proof of NP-hardness is based the reduction from computing causality in bi-
nary causal models to computing causality in counterexamples. The problem of comput-
ing causality in binary causal models is NP-complete [EL01]. The reduction from binary
causal models to Boolean circuits and from Boolean circuits to model-checking, shown in
[CHK08], is based on the automata-theoretic approach to branching-time model checking
([KVW00]), and proves that computing causality in model checking of branching time
specifications is NP-complete. On a single trace linear-time and branching temporal log-
ics coincide, and computing the causes for satisfaction is easily reducible to computing
the causes for falsification.
The proof of membership in NP is straightforward: given a pathπ and a formula
ϕ that is falsified onπ, the number of pairs〈s, v〉 is |ϕ| · |π|; for a pair〈s, v〉, we can
non-deterministically choose a setA of bottom-valued pairs; checking whether changing
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L on S makes〈s, v〉 critical for the falsification ofϕ requires model-checkingϕ on the
modifiedπ twice, and thus can be done in linear time.
5.3 An over-approximation algorithm
The counterexamples we work with have a finite number of states. When representing an
infinite path, the counterexample will contain a loop indication, i.e., an indication that the
last state in the counterexample is equal to one of the earlier states.
Let ϕ be a formula, given in negation normal form, and letπ[0..k] = s0, s1, ..., sk be
a non-empty counterexample for it, consisting of a finite number of states and a possible
loop indication. We assume that the counterexample contains a loop only if it is necessary
for demonstrating the failure. In other words, ifπ[0..k] |=/fϕ then we assume thatπ[0..k]
has no loop indication.
We denote byπ[i..k] the suffix ofπ[0..k] that starts atsi. The procedureC below
producesC(π[i..k], ψ), the approximation of the set of causes for the failure of a sub-
formulaψ on the suffix ofπ[0..k] that starts withsi. We invoke the procedureC with the
arguments(π[0..k], ϕ) to produce the set of causes for the failure ofϕ onπ[0..k].
During the computation ofC(π[i..k], ϕ), we use the auxiliary functionval, that eval-
uates sub-formulas ofϕ on the given path. It returns0 if the sub-formula fails on the path
and 1 otherwise. The computation ofval is done in parallel with the computation of the
causality set, and relies on recursively computed causality sets for sub-formulas ofϕ. The
value ofval is computed as follows:
• val(π[i..k], true) = 1
• val(π[i..k], false) = 0
• For any formulaϕ 6∈ {true, false}, val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 1 iff C(π[i..k], ϕ) = ∅
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Algorithm 30 (Causality Set). An approximated causality setC for π[i..k] andψ is com-
puted as follows
• C(π[i..k], true) = C(π[i..k], false) = ∅
• C(π[i..k], p) =
 {〈si, p〉} if p 6∈ si∅ otherwise
• C(π[i..k],¬p) =
 {〈si, p〉} if p ∈ L(si)∅ otherwise
• C(π[i..k],Xϕ) =
 C(π[i+ 1..k], ϕ) if i < k∅ otherwise
• C(π[i..k], ϕ ∧ ψ) = C(π[i..k], ϕ) ∪ C(π[i..k], ψ)
• C(π[i..k], ϕ ∨ ψ) = C(π[i..k], ϕ) ∪ C(π[i..k], ψ) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 0 andval(π[i..k], ψ) = 0∅ otherwise
• C(π[i..k],Gϕ) =
C(π[i..k], ϕ) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 0
C(π[i+ 1..k],Gϕ) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 1 andi < k andval(π[i..k],XGϕ) = 0
∅ otherwise
• C(π[i..k], [ϕUψ]) =
C(π[i..k], ψ) ∪ C(π[i..k], ϕ) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 0 andval(π[i..k], ψ) = 0
C(π[i..k], ψ) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 1 andval(π[i..k], ψ) = 0 andi = k
C(π[i..k], ψ) ∪ C(π[i+ 1..k], [ϕUψ]) if val(π[i..k], ϕ) = 1 andval(π[i..k], ψ) = 0
andi < k andval(π[i..k],X[ϕUψ]) = 0
∅ otherwise
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The procedure above recursively computes a set of causes for the given formulaϕ on
the suffix of a counterexampleπ[i..k]. At the proposition level,p is considered a cause
in the current state if and only if it has a bottom-value in the state. At every level of the
recursion, a sub-formula is considered relevant (that is, its exploration can produce causes
for falsification of the whole specification) if it has a value offalseat the current state.
We explain in detail the recursive computation for theUntil operator, since it is the
most difficult to follow.
When examining the computation pathπ[i..k], the subformulaη = [ϕUψ] will be
explored only in the case thatη has a value ofalseonπ[i..k]. There could be one of the
three reasons for this:
1. The value ofϕ on π[i..k] is false , and the value ofψ on π[i..k] is false, in which
case the causality set will be the union of the causality sets forϕ and forψ.
2. The value ofϕ onπ[i..k] is true or unknown , and the value ofψ onπ[i..k] is false,
andi = k . In this case we know that the Until formula does not fail on any finite
prefix of the counterexample (and therefore it must have a loop). The causality set
is the set forψ, since the reason for the failure is the fact thatψ never holds.
3. The value ofϕ onπ[i..k] is true or unknown, the value ofψ onπ[i..k] is false, and
the value ofX[ϕUψ] onπ[i..k] is false. Here the Until formula has not failed yet,
but we know that it will. We thus take as causality sets the set forψ, to show that it
has continuously failed to hold so far, and the set forX[ϕUψ].
Lemma 31. The complexity of Algorithm 30 is linear ink and in|ϕ|.
Proof. The complexity follows from the fact that each subformulaψ of ϕ is evaluated at
most once at each statesi of the counterexampleπ.
Theorem 32. The set of pairs produced by Algorithm 30 for a formulaϕ on a pathπ is
an over-approximation of the set of causes forϕ onπ according to Definition 28.
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For the proof of Theorem 32, we consider an evaluation graph forϕ n a given path
π. An LTL formulaϕ, given in Negation Normal Form, can be decomposed according to
the following two rules (that appear, for example, in [Wol85, MP85]):
• ψ1 Uψ2 ≡ (ψ2 ∨ (ψ1 ∧X(ψ1 Uψ2)))
• Gψ ≡ ψ ∧X(Gψ)
Given a finite prefix of an execution pathπ[0..k], we can build a labeled AND-OR
evaluation graph forϕ on π[0..k]. Each node will be labeled with a state and a formula
that should be evaluated in the state. Internal nodes are labeled also by an operator, AND
or OR, that indicates how the evaluations of the children nodes are combined. The root of
the graph will be labeled with(s0, ϕ). A leaf noden labeled(si, ϕ) is expanded according
to its label:
• If ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, we construct two new nodes, and label them with(si, ψ1) and
(si, ψ2). The noden is then labeled also with AND.
• Forϕ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, the same as item (1) with the label ofn being OR.
• If ϕ = Xψ, we add a child node and label it(si+1, ψ).
• Finally, if ϕ = Gψ or ϕ = ψ1 Uψ2 we expand the formula according to the
expansion rules given above.
For a pathπ of lengthk, the graph is expanded according to the above given rules, until
all leaf nodes are labeled with one of the following:
• (sk+1, ρ) with ρ being any formula, or
• (si, l) wherei ≤ k andl is a literal (a variable or its negation).
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Figure 5.3: An evaluation graph foraU (bU c)
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the AND-OR evaluation graph for the formulaaU (bU c), on a
two-state path. To evaluate the formula, we now consider the given pathπ[0..k]: every
proposition gets a value (true or false) as indicated inπ, and the evaluation is performed
bottom-up, starting from the leaves. Note that in general a leaf’s value may be unknown,
if it depends on values from the statesk+1, that are not given inπ[0..k]. However, in our
circumstances this would not affect the evaluation ofϕ onπ sinceπ[0..k] is a counterex-
ample, and thereforeϕ evaluates tofalseon it. Figure 5.4 presents the evaluation graph
of aU (bU c), with the values added forπ[0..1] = a · ∅. We use the evaluation graph to
prove Theorem 32.
Proof of Theorem 32.For a formulaϕ and a pathπ[0..k], we examine the evaluation
graph as described above. Sinceϕ fails on π, the value of the root isfalse. We look
at evaluation pathsε in the graph, that start from a leaf and go backward all the way to
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Figure 5.4: Evaluation ofaU (bU c) onπ[0..1] = a · ∅
the root. Ifε visits only falselabeled nodes, we call it af ilure path . The claim below is
needed for the rest of the proof.
Claim 33. Let l be a literal inϕ and si a state inπ[0..k]. We denotevl the variable
corresponding tol (that is,l = ¬vl or l = vl). Then the following holds.
1. Let ε be afailure path in the evaluation graph ofϕ on π[0..k], such that its leaf
is labeled with(si, l). If l evaluates tofalse in si, then the pair〈si, vl〉 is a cause
according to Algorithm 30.
2. If a pair〈si, vl〉 is a cause according to Definition 28, then there must exist afailure
path ε on which(si, l) appears in the leaf label, andl evaluates tofalse in si.
By item (2) of Claim 33, if〈si, vl〉 is a cause according to Definition 28, thenv gets
a bottom-value on a leaf of a failure path. But by item (1) of the claim, in this case
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〈si, vl〉 is also a cause according to Algorithm 30. Thus the algorithm produces an over-
approximation of the causal set according to Definition 28.
Proof of Claim 33. 1. A close examination of Algorithm 30 shows that a pair〈si, vl〉
gets into the causality set ifvl assumes a bottom-value insi. It will be passed on to
the next level of the recursion as long as the sub-formula thatvl belongs to keeps
gettingfalse. This is the same as visiting onlyfalselabeled nodes on the way to the
root.
2. Suppose the pair〈si, vl〉 can be madecritical. That means that after switching
some bottom values,ϕ still fails onπ[0..k], but switching〈si, vl〉 now changes the
value ofϕ onπ[0..k]. Note that(si, l) must be located on a failure path; otherwise
switching its value cannot change the value ofϕ.
We note that not all bottom-valued leaves that have a failure path to the root are causes
(otherwise Algorithm 30 would always give accurate results). In our experience though,
Algorithm 30 gives accurate results for the majority of real-life examples. As an example
of a formula on which Algorithm 30 does not give an accurate result, considerϕ =
aU (bU c) and a traceπ = s0, s1, s2, . . . labeled asa · (∅)ω (see Figure 5.2). The formula
ϕ fails onπ, andπ[0..1] is the shortest prefix on which it fails. What is the set of causes
for failure ofϕ on π[0..1]? The pair〈s0, a〉 is not a cause, since it is not bottom-valued.
Checking all possible changes of sets of bottom-valued pairs shows that〈s0, b〉 is not a
cause. On the other hand,〈s1, a〉 and〈s1, b〉 are causes because changing the value of
a in s1 from 0 to 1 makesϕ unknown on π[0..1], and similarly for〈s1, b〉. The pairs
〈s0, c〉 and〈s1, c〉 are causes because changing the value ofc in eithers0 or s1 from 0 to
1 changes the value ofϕ to true on π[0..1]. The values of signals ins2 are not causes
because the first failure ofϕ happens ins1. The causes are represented graphically as red
dots in Figure 5.2. By examining the algorithm, we can see that onϕ a dπ it outputs the
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set of pairs that contains, in addition to the exact set of causes, the pair〈s0, b〉.
5.4 Discussion
The definition of an explanation for a counterexample reflects two major decisions. First,
we chose to detect a set of causes for the temporallyfirst failure only (that is, the smallest
k such thatπ[0..k] |=/fϕ). We believe that this is the most beneficial for the user; in many
cases, other failures demonstrated by the computation path are a consequence of the first
one. For example, in the design of a hardware model, it is common to have anerror
signal, that is never supposed to rise, however, once rises, it stays in this position forever.
For the formulaG¬error, only the first state wererror=1 is interesting, since the rest are
a consequence of the first.
Another decision made when choosing the definition is that for the first failure, we try
to find all values that have any influence on the failure. That is where the definition of
causality, rather thancriticality, comes into play. We believe that our explanations, at this
stage, should furnish the user with all she needs to debug the error. Choosing to provide
a critical set as an explanation, would make this set minimal, such that switching any of
the values would make the formula pass in the computation path.
Such a set can be detected by translating the counterexample path and the formula into
a CNF formula via a BMC translation. This CNF formula would be unsatisfiable, and the
unsat core [LS04, MLA+05] provided by the satisfiability solver would be a minimal set
that demonstrate the failure. We think, however, that this is not good enough for the user.
For example, let our formula beG(p∧ q), on a single-state trace∅. Thenp andq are each
an unsat core, and therefore only one of them will be provided. If the user is to debug the




Conclusion and Future Directions
We have approached two different aspects of model checking. In Chapters 3 and 4 we ex-
amined different ways to use Description Logic reasoning for symbolic model checking.
In Chapter 5 we proposed a method to analyze a counterexample. Below we summarize
each of the chapters and discuss future research directions.
Bounded model checking of safety formulas using DL
We have presented several methods to perform bounded model checking of safety proper-
ties using Description Logic reasoning. All of these methods have the nice property that
the encoding of the problem as a DL ontology is of constant size in terms of the original
problem, and once set, the model checking task is performed by the DL reasoning tool,
with no intervention. This is in contrast to BDD-based model checking tools that need to
custom-build the model checking algorithm using BDDs. For bounded model checking,
a given model descriptionMD and a boundk are represented in DL with an ontology of
size|MD|+k, as opposed to|MD|×k when translatingMD to a propositional formula
in order to use a satisfiability solver. Our method can thus be viewed as a natural setting
for a symbolic representation of bounded model checking problems, avoiding the need to
unfold the model as done for SAT based BMC.
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The methods described in Chapter 3 used the DL reasoner as a black box, and no
attempt has been made to tune the DL algorithms to better work for the task of model
checking. In the future it would be interesting to examine the internal DL algorithms in
light of our application. First, the results of Section 3.5 demonstrate that different encod-
ings of the same problem vary dramatically in performance. If this is found to be inherent
in the DL algorithms, it would be natural to search for easily detectable conditions, where
one encoding can be automatically translated into another, that is easier to reason about.
This could improve the reasoning performance for some applications, as demonstrated by
our results. Second, at least one of our encodings (the one usingALC), seems to perform
very well as long as the bound is small enough. It is interesting to understand what causes
the blow-up for larger bounds. If this problem can be overcome, it would enable the use
of DL for model checking, and potentially improve the performance of DL reasoning in
general.
Finally, when a concept is found to be consistent with respect to a given terminology,
the DL reasoner is capable of providing a satisfying interpretation. Since the existence
of an interpretation, in our setting, indicates a bug in the model, the interpretation should
be translated into a readable counterexample. Note that the interpretation can possibly be
only partial, since the tableaux reasoning algorithm may not depend on all concepts of the
terminology. For such cases, some mechanism should be developed, to derive the lacking
information.
Liveness and fairness using DL
We have approached model checking of liveness formulas using DL reasoning, and showed
that a formula of the typeAFp can be easily encoded overALC when no fairness con-
straints are involved. When fairness constraints are required, encoding in common di-
alects of DL is not possible. We showed however, that the tableaux reasoning procedure
can be modified to support fairness in bounded model checking. In order to achieve un-
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bounded model checking, the algorithm should be iterated with increasing bounds. This
makes our method less efficient when no fair cycle exists (the formula holds in the model)
or when the fair loop is long. The experiments we have presented, comparing our method
to the model checkerVIS, support the observation that our approach would be more ben-
eficial when a fair loop does exist in the model (i.e. a bug is found). More experiments
should be performed, however, to understand the extent to which our method can be ben-
eficial.
Model checking of liveness properties is considered more difficult than model check-
ing of safety ones, and special attention has been devoted to this type of formula in the lit-
erature, both using BDD-based methods [BGS00, RBS00, BGS06], and using SAT-based
techniques [AS04, GGA05]. It has been recognized, however, that no single method can
outperform others on all models [BDEGW03, Nev08]. State of the art model checkers in-
voke multiple algorithms for each model checking problem, presenting the user with the
result of the first method to terminate. Our method, if found beneficial for a significant
range of models, could fit nicely in such a platform, speeding up verification time for part
of the models.
Counterexample explanation
We have shown how the causality definition of Halpern and Pearl [HP01] can be adapted
to the task of explaining a counterexample. Since the causality algorithm is applied to
a single counterexample, ignoring the model from which it was extracted, no size issues
are involved, and the execution time is negligible. An important advantage of our method
is the fact that it is independent of the tool that produced the counterexample. When
more than one model checking “engine” is invoked to verify a formula, as described
in [BDEGW03, Nev08], the independence of the causality algorithm is especially impor-
tant. We note that our approach, though demonstrated here forLTL specifications, can
work in the same manner forACTL formulas, since on a single computation path,LTL
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andACTL formulas coincide.
In the future, it would be interesting to extend our method to other linear temporal log-
ics used in practice, such as PSL [Acc03]. While our definition should hold for this logic
as well, the approximation algorithm should be extended without increasing its complex-
ity. Since the algorithm we provided produces an over-approximation of the causality set,
it is interesting to see if the language for which it provides the exact causality set could be
characterized. Finally, the approach we have presented defines and (approximately) de-
tects a set of causes for thefirst failure of a formula on a trace. While we believe that this
information is the most beneficial for the user, other definitions can also be considered.
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